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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I offer two essays on international finance with particular attention
to the sovereign debt maturity structure along with the dilution problem and interbank
credit crisis that propagates from one country to another. First one is a study on the effect
of varying maturity structure on the default probabilities and prices of bonds with and
without the dilution problem while the later one develops a financially integrated two-
country model with moral hazard and asymmetric information in the banking sector of
the economy where endogenously determined interest rates in the economy may cause
interbank credit freeze due to overaccumulation of assets and/or a mild productivity
shock.
In “Sovereign Debt Maturity Structure and Dilution”, I investigate different maturity
structure of sovereign bonds; starting from short-term bonds only. I assume that the
sovereign can issue only short-term bonds or long-term bonds, and then extended the
work with both short- and long-term bonds. Finally, I also investigate what happens to
the default probabilities and the prices of bonds if there is a compensation covenant in the
sovereign debt contracts for the long-term bondholders to mitigate the dilution problem.
The finding is that the maturity structure of sovereign bonds plays an important role in
determining the default probabilities and bond prices. Sovereign can improve these by
issuing both type of bonds. Moreover, inclusion of the compensation covenant mitigates
the dilution problem of sovereign debt in a larger scale when the maturity of long-term
bonds is sufficiently high.
x
In “Interbank Liquidity Crisis and International Contagion”, we develop a two-country
model with integration in different ways. We investigate integration in terms of labor, de-
posit, capital mobility both individually and in different combination. Privately known
intermediation skills of banks make them heterogeneous and gives rise to the interbank
market. When countries are integrated through the banking channel, different corporate
lending rates also give rise to different deposit rates and capital supply but the same inter-
bank lending rate. Overaccumulation of assets causes excessive supply of funds during
a mild negative productivity shock and creates an interbank market credit freeze in one
country which propagates to another country through the interbank lending market.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains a brief overview of the two essays on international finance in
my dissertation.
In chapter 2, “Sovereign Debt Maturity Structure and Dilution”, I study the matu-
rity structure of sovereign debt in various combinations- short-term bonds only, long-
term bonds only, and both short- and long-term bonds as in benchmark form of Arellano
(2008) and in extended form as in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012). However, I used
the probabilistic maturity structure of bonds as in Leland (1998) and in Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2015). The idea is to compare the default probabilities and bond prices in
each scenario. The findings are quite interesting. Sovereign chooses short-term bonds for
lower borrowing requirements and long-term bonds for higher borrowing requirements.
Issuing long-term bonds provide more borrowing capacity before default is optimal than
issuing short-term bonds. Multiple maturity structure improves both default probabil-
ities and bond prices than in case of only short-term bonds or only long-term bonds. I
also included the compensation covenant as in Hatchondo et al. (2016) and study the ef-
fects on default probabilities and bond prices under cases where sovereign issues only
long-term bonds and both short- and long-term bonds. The finding is during low output
periods, prices drop less frequently with compensation covenant than without. Compen-
sation covenant reduces dilution problem while also reducing the default probabilities if
the maturity of the long-term bond is sufficiently high. Short-term bond price rises with
the increase of the maturity of long-term bonds with compensation covenant. From the
policy making perspective, sovereign can reduce the default probabilities while keeping
2
the bond prices high by issuing long-term bonds with sufficiently higher maturity along
with short term bonds with compensation covenant.
In chapter 3, “Interbank Liquidity Crisis and International Contagion”, we study a
two-country model of banking crises in an effort to extend the closed economy model of
Boissay et al. (2016). We study the extension in many dimensions- full integration of two
countries where depositors can save in any country, labors and mobile, interbank lending
is open, and corporate lending market is open; only one of these are open; integration in
combinations of these. The finding is the interbank market equilibrium is different for
two-country model than the closed economy counterpart only if the interbank lending
market is open. Different corporate rates make deposit rates and capital supply in two
countries different. However, the main mechanism remains the same. After continuous
positive productivity shock, with a mild negative shock interbank credit freeze hits due
to overaccumulation of assets by any of the countries. The novel finding is that the inter-
bank credit freeze propagates to another country as well which would have an otherwise
functioning interbank lending market. Moral hazard and asymmetric information play
important roles in the mechanism. The model is strong in terms of endogeneously de-
termined boom-bust cycles because of a mild shock, not an exogenous big shock as in
the financial friction literature. Moreover, the interbank lending rate and corporate rates
are endogenously determined, not exogenous as in the sudden stop literature. The find-
ings are interesting. Typical crisis is triggered by a moderate negative productivity shock
toward the end of an unusual boom in credit. Endogenously determined interest rates
dynamics play a central role to explain sudden interbank credit freeze. A “sail-together”
financial integration may go into a “sink-together” interbank credit freeze. From policy
making perspective, there are needs of framework for both crisis management and inter-
national policy co-ordinations.
3
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CHAPTER 2. SOVEREIGN DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE AND
DILUTION
Mohammad Nurul Hasan
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to the Journal of International Economics
2.1 Abstract
Maturity structure of debt plays an important role in default probability and the re-
sulting pricing of sovereign bonds. Using a calibrated model this chapter shows that both
of these features get improved when the sovereign issues long-term bonds or both short-
and long-term bonds instead of issuing only short-term bonds. This chapter also shows
that inclusion of the compensation covenant mitigates the dilution problem of sovereign
debt in a larger scale when the maturity of long-term bonds is sufficiently high.
JEL Classification: F34, H63
Keywords: sovereign debt, sovereign default, maturity structure, debt dilution, compen-
sation covenant.
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2.2 Introduction
An important mechanism of financing the fiscal deficit is issuing sovereign bonds
which engendered several policy debates, over the last two decades, including recently
debated optimal maturity structure, and debt dilution problem inherent to such sovereign
debt. Moreover, it is evident from figure 2.1 (Beers and de Leon-Manlagnit, 2019) that
advanced economies are also susceptible to default which adds to the dimension of the
sovereign default problem that was supposedly pertinent to only emerging/frontier mar-
ket economies. Figure 2.1 shows the total sovereign debt in default in US dollar between
the period of 1975 and 2018. The figure also depicts that sovereign default problem is not
fading out by time rather coming back strongly in new dimensions since nearly 40 per-
cent of sovereign default amount was coming from the advanced economies in the year of
2018. In this chapter I show the linkage between the maturity structure of sovereign debt
and the dilution problem. In particular, extending the study of Arellano (2008), I show
the sovereign debt contract with only long-term maturity structure and both short- and
long-term maturity structure. Default probabilities go down and therefore bond prices go
up as we go from bonds with only short-term maturity to bonds with only long-term ma-
turity and finally, to both maturity structure. As a potential solution of the debt dilution
problem, I add the compensation covenant in Hatchondo et al. (2016) and find improve-
ment in sovereign bond prices under the framework of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015).
If a sovereign keeps increasing debt level then probability of default also increases
and sometimes lead to eventual default. A higher default probability is adjusted through
reduction in the value of bonds- a debt dilution faced by the sovereign. Debt dilution
problem arises because current government cannot control the bond issuances by the fu-
ture governments. It is not possible to restrict a sovereign from issuing bonds since doing
so may lead to restricting the sovereign from consumption. Therefore, a covenant of “no
6
Figure 2.1: Sovereign Debt in Default
further issuance of bonds” is never a feasible idea. However, any additional bond issued
by the sovereign results in higher risk of default anticipated by the rational investors and
therefore investors offer lower price for the bonds. Eventually, the sovereign faces a di-
lution in the value of their issued bonds in the market. A possible way of reducing the
debt dilution problem is to shorten the maturity of the bonds. However, shortening the
maturity of bonds would increase the rollover risk for the sovereign, i.e., the risk of higher
borrowing cost. There is a trade-off between the short-term debt which has a relative in-
centive benefit and the long-term debt which has a hedging benefit. This trade-off of the
maturity structure is reflected through the price functions. Therefore, there should be a
suitable solution for the optimal maturity structure and the debt dilution problem.
Government bonds are issued in the primary market and traded in the secondary
market. The price is determined based on the default premium coming from the de-
fault risk of the sovereign at the time the bond is issued in the primary market. In the
secondary market, the price reflects the current situation of the sovereign. Issuing more
bonds increases the default risk of the sovereign and therefore default premium increases
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to reduce the price of the bond. The senior bondholders (who purchased bonds in earlier
periods) are affected by the borrowing decision of the sovereign since the price at which
they can sell the bonds they hold in the secondary market is lower than what would have
been without more borrowing by the bond issuing sovereign. Even if the bondholders
hold their bonds until maturity, they face an increased default risk due to increase in debt
level through issuance of more bonds by the sovereign. Only the new bondholders get
the compensation of the higher default risk through lower bond price. This requires to
arrange a compensation package for the existing bondholders before any new issuance of
sovereign bonds.
Several authors propose varying solutions to mitigate the debt dilution problem. While
Hatchondo et al. (2016) propose imposing a maximum limit on either total foreign debt
or debt-to-GDP ratio, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) corroborate the idea of seniority
of sovereign debt creditors. The idea proposed by Hatchondo et al. (2016) is supposed
to reduce the probability of default and ensure the existing bondholders a compensa-
tion in case the sovereign wants to issue more bonds. Bond covenant can include the
clause of compensation equal to the differential of the observed price and the price at
which the bonds would be traded without new bond issues. To circumvent the diffi-
culty of finding the counterfactual price, the authors study two covenants which set a
penalty if the sovereign chooses a debt level above a threshold or borrows at bond prices
below a threshold. However, a differential compensation is not enough for the existing
bondholders when the sovereign defaults and all the creditors, both earlier and later, get
repaid at the same proportion during the settlement. Moreover, Hatchondo et al. (2016)
use debt-to-GDP ratio as a measure of debt level which requires continuous adjustment
of sovereign debt due to the change in GDP, if the ratio is close to the threshold.
To avoid the problem of continuous adjustment of sovereign debt, Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2015) propose a relative seniority arrangement where all the creditors lose
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an equal amount of outstanding debt but get paid based on pre-decided seniority for
the remaining portion of debt in case of reorganization after default by the borrowing
sovereign. This is for the resolution of dispute among the creditors under absolute se-
niority arrangement. A seniority arrangement specifies the allocation of repayments after
default and therefore, such an arrangement is not a suitable candidate for the solution of
the sovereign debt dilution problem. Even with a seniority arrangement, debt dilution
problem exists. For instance, an investor A may buy a long-term sovereign bond and
would like to sell it before the maturity. If the sovereign issues further long-term bonds
then the default risk increases for the sovereign and the price goes down in the secondary
market to adjust this risk. If the investor A is still holding the previously issued bond then
he faces the downward price movement when selling the bond before maturity. Now, a
seniority rule may act as an insurance for the investor for getting the investment back
after the default by the sovereign. However, such arrangement fails to even reduce the
problem of downward price movement faced by the investors like A who intend to sell
the security before the maturity. Therefore, seniority arrangement cannot fully eliminate
the debt dilution when the default probability is increased because of new borrowings.
Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) also observe that a seniority arrangement is not sufficient to
eliminate debt dilution when default probability is increased through new borrowings.
Following Arellano (2008), this chapter initiates with the basic model of sovereign debt
of only one period, i.e., short-term bond. Then, I study the model with only long-term
bond followed by the model with multiple maturity structure which includes both the
short- and long-term bonds. I also include the compensation covenant in Hatchondo
et al. (2016) for both long-term bonds contract and contracts with short- and long-term
bonds as a solution of the debt dilution problem. However, I follow the model struc-
ture of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) with a probabilistic maturity of the bonds. In
the appendix, I show the sovereign debt model with settlement of defaulted bonds where
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settlement happens in one of the later periods when the sovereign gets back to the inter-
national financial market after an exclusion due to the default decision on outstanding
debt. Finally, I also explore the competing solutions of the debt dilution problem, e.g.,
debt threshold covenant, price threshold covenant, and income-contingent debt.
The chapter proceeds from here with the literature review of sovereign debt maturity
structure and the dilution problem in section 2.3. In section 2.4, there are basic models of
only short-term sovereign bonds as in Arellano (2008), long-term bonds in Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2015) framework, and bonds with both maturity structure as in Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2012). Section 2.5 shows the models without the debt dilution problem
while introducing compensation covenant to the existing bondholders with both long-
term bonds and maturity structure of short- and long-term bonds. Section 2.6 presents
the comparative analyses of all the models used for different maturity structure of long-
term bonds. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter .
2.3 Literature Review
Sovereign debt has an extensive literature covering but not limited to existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium, strategic structure of the debt market, contract and maturity
choice, settlement following default, restructuring without default, reputation and par-
tial default, debt dilution and added covenants, fiscal rules and default, default cost, and
contagion and correlated defaults. The seminal paper in sovereign debt literature is Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) where the authors introduce the sovereign debt commitment prob-
lem and default decision of the sovereign in comparison to repayment based on relative
welfare on either decisions. There is a substantial body of work in sovereign debt liter-
ature based on the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) framework. See Aguiar et al. (2016) for a
detailed quantitative literature on diverse issues of sovereign debt.
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Arellano (2008), with a one period model, shows how default is more likely in reces-
sions using business cycles data of Argentina. However, while the defaulting sovereign
and the creditors resolve through settlements in most of the cases, this paper assumes that
the sovereign never pay back the defaulted debt. Later, Arellano and Ramanarayanan
(2012) study on the emerging markets term structure of interest rate spreads and the ma-
turity composition of government debt and show that the sovereign has more incentive
to repay in case of short-term debt whereas long-term debt is a hedge against future fluc-
tuations in spread. Understanding the emerging market sovereign debt maturity struc-
ture requires comprehending this trade-off between the incentive benefits of short-term
debt and hedging benefits of long-term debt. Broner et al. (2013) document that shorter-
maturity debt is issued in crisis periods while long-term debt is issued in normal times
by the emerging market sovereigns.
Although the solution of debt dilution has got attention recently, the literature on
sovereign dent dilution is intensive. Borensztein et al. (2006) observe that emerging-
market borrowers face a lengthy and costly period of restructuring due to debt dilution.
The possibility of dilution induces the sovereign borrowers to opt for short-term bonds
(Kletzer, 1984; Sachs and Cohen, 1982) since such bonds are difficult to dilute or debt those
cannot be restructured easily to raise the cost of default and lower the likelihood of default
(Dooley, 2000). The short-term debt introduces the rollover crisis driven by lenders’ con-
fidence (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Cole et al., 1996), and hard-to-dilute bonds worsen
the crisis inefficiently (Bolton and Jeanne, 2009).
Absolute priority rule in repayments of bondholders is explicitly studied in sovereign
debt literature (Borensztein et al., 2006; Bolton and Skeel Jr, 2004; Bolton and Jeanne, 2009;
Gelpern, 2004). However, absolute seniority is not a panacea of debt dilution problem and
therefore there should be a relative seniority rule (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2015). There
11
may also be a compensation package for the existing bondholders before issuing any new
bonds by the sovereign (Hatchondo et al., 2016).
2.4 The Basic Models
2.4.1 Sovereign Debt with Short-term Bonds
We have a small open economy where the sovereign government decides on both
consumption and savings/borrowing on behalf of the domestic residents who face fluc-
tuating endowment stream. The sovereign faces the given world risk-free interest rate
and cannot change it through any decisions. The sovereign can borrow from the credit
market where the lenders are risk-neutral. Sovereign debt contracts are not enforceable
in the international financial market and therefore, a sovereign can take a default deci-
sion at any time on the outstanding debt. In case of default, the sovereign is assumed to
be excluded temporarily from the international credit market and to incur output costs
directly. Sovereign bond price available to the sovereign make creditors break even in
expected value and reflect the default event likelihood.
The paper proceeds from here by describing the endowment and preference structure
of the sovereign first. Then, we give description of the financial market and events timing.
Afterwards, we describe both the sovereign’s and the lenders’ problem followed by the
recursive equilibrium.
The economy has identical, risk averse households who have preferences given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct), 0 < β < 1. (2.1)
where, c is the consumption, β is the discount factor, and u(·) is increasing and strictly
concave. y is the tradable good with a stochastic stream and received by the households.
The output shock is a Markov process with a transition function f(y′, y) with a compact
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support. There is a lump sum transfer of goods from the government to the households.
The former is benevolent with an objective of maximizing the utility of the later.
The government can sell one-period discount bonds b′ at price q(y, b′) in the interna-
tional financial markets and decides, at the end of the period, whether to default or repay
on its outstanding debt. The default probability depends on both the aggregate shock y,
and the size of the bond b′. Therefore, the bond price function q(y, b′) also depends on
both of these two and is endogenous to the default incentive of the government. Purchas-
ing a discount bond with price q(y, b′), where b′ ≥ 0, means saving q(y, b′)b′ units of goods
in the current period to receive next period b′ units of goods. Purchasing a discount bond
with price q(y, b′), where b′ ≤ 0, means receiving −q(y, b′)b′ units of goods in the current
period to deliver b′ units of goods the next period, conditional on not declaring default.
The households receive all the proceedings of the international credit operations by the
government in a lump sum way.
Being benevolent, the government, with an effort to smooth consumption, uses bor-
rowing form the international credit market effectively. y induces an idiosyncratic income
uncertainty, and the asset markets are incomplete due to two reasons: (i) an endogenous
default risk, (ii) an uncertain set of available assets. The set of available bonds pay a state
and time invariant amount which cannot insure away the idiosyncratic income uncer-
tainty.
The cost of default has two components: direct output cost, φ(y) and exclusion from
the international financial market. This specification follows the results of defaulting from
recent events, i.e., lower aggregate output and a temporary loss of access to the interna-
tional financial market. With this specification, all outstanding debts get erased from the
budget constraint of the government and it is no longer allowed to participate in the in-
ternational financial market, i.e., the government cannot save or borrow. Following a
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default, there is a stochastic number of period for the government in financial autarky
and reenters the markets with an exogenous probability ξ.
Following is the government resource constraint of a small open economy:
c ≤
 y − q(y, b
′)b′ + b Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.2)
The international credit market has a constant interest rate, r∗ > 0, at which investors
can lend or borrow as much as required. Investors can observe the income level every
period and therefore, they possess perfect information about the endowment process of
the economy. Foreign creditors are risk-neutral, i.e., in every bond contract offered they
break even in expected value. Every period lenders choose loans b′ to maximize expected
profits π, taking prices as given:
π = q(y, b′)b′ − 1− d(y, b
′)
1 + r∗
b′ (2.3)
where d(y, b′) is the probability of default which depends on the level of income, y and
level of foreign asset holdings, b′.
The probability of default, d(y, b′) is zero for positive level of foreign asset holdings,
b′ ≥ 0. In this case, the price of a bond is equal to the opportunity cost of the credi-
tors. If the level of foreign asset holdings in negative, b′ < 0, then the equilibrium bond
price equals to the opportunity cost after risk-adjustment. This bond prices are, therefore,
required to satisfy
q(y, b′) =
1− d(y, b′)
1 + r∗
(2.4)
Following is the the timing of events within each period. The government, foreign
creditors, and households act sequentially. The government enters each period with asset
level b to repay at the end of the period. The income shock y is the observed by the gov-
ernment, who decides whether to default or repay its outstanding debt obligations at the
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end of the period. If the government decides to repay, then chooses b′ subject to resource
constraint, given the bond price schedule q(y, b′). Otherwise, the government defaults
on its debt and exits the international financial market for a stochastic period of time. In
case of repayment by the government, creditors choose b′, taking q as given. Following
these events, consumption c takes place by the households. Consumption includes the
endowment and the government transfer from the international financial market credit
operations.
The economy is characterized by a recursive equilibrium where the government’s pol-
icy function b′, bonds’ price function q, and consumers’ policy functions c determine the
equilibrium, given aggregate states s = (y, b). The government chooses whether to repay
or default, given initial foreign assets b and after observing the income shock y. With the
choice of repayment of debt obligations, the government then decides the new level of
foreign assets b′, given the price of new borrowing q(y, b′), that depends on the states y
and the choice of b′.
Let V o(y, b) be the lifetime utility of a sovereign that enters a period with V o(y, b) and
maintains a good standing (not in default state) and V d(y) be the lifetime utility of a
sovereign in default.
Let V o(y, b) be the sovereign’s lifetime utility with good standing (not in default) while
entering a period with (y, b) and V d(y) be the sovereign’s lifetime utility in default. When
the government decides to default, the economy goes into a financial autarky for a short
period of time and income falls by φ(y). Then the value of default is given by,
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, 0)] (2.5)
Where, ξ is the probability of reentry in the international financial market.
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The payoff from repaying the debt and remaining in the contract, denoted V c(y, b), is
given by
V c(y, b) = max
b′∈B
[u(y − q(y, b′)b′ + b) + βE{y′|y}V o(y′, b′)] (2.6)
The government solves the utility maximization problem by choosing the optimal
level of new debt b′ in each period. The expected value of remaining in the contract
incorporates the fact that default choice could be made by the government at any time in
the future. To prevent any Ponzi schemes, there is a lower bound on the level of new debt
that government may choose, b′ ≥ −Z which is not binding in equilibrium otherwise.
Finally, given the default option, V o(y, b) satisfies
V o(y, b) = max{V c(y, b), V d(y)} (2.7)
The default policy of the government can be characterized by repayment sets and default
sets. Let R(b) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is repayment
when assets are b, such that
R(b) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, b) ≥ vd(y)}
and let D(b) = R̃(b) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is default
for assets level of b:
D(b) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, b) < vd(y)}
The equilibrium bond price function q(y, b′) should correctly assess the probability of de-
fault by the government and therefore, needs to be consistent with the optimization of
the government and with the expected zero profits for the lenders. Default probabilities
d(y, b′) and default sets D(b′) are therefore related in the following way:
d(y, b′) =
∫
D(b′)
f(y′, y)dy′ (2.8)
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The equilibrium default probabilities d(y, b′) are equal to zero when there are empty
default sets, D(b′) = ∅ because the optimal choice is to repay for all realizations of the
endowment shocks, with assets b′. Default probabilities d(y, b′) are equal to one when
D(b′) = Y because for any realization of the endowment shocks it is optimal to default.
Definition 1: The definition of the recursive equilibrium of the economy is given by a set of
policy functions (i) government’s asset holdings b′(s), default sets D(b), and repayment sets R(b),
(ii) consumption c(s), and the price function for bonds q(y, b′) such that
1. Given the bond price function q(y, b′), the government’s policy functions b′(s), default sets
D(b), and repayment sets R(b) satisfy the government optimization problem.
2. Given the government policies, households’ consumption c(s) satisfies the resource constraint.
3. Bond prices q(y, b′) are consistent with both the default probabilities of the government and the
expected zero profits by the creditors.
2.4.2 Sovereign Debt with Long-term Bonds
This section differs from the previous one in terms of the maturity of the debt con-
tracts. Here, long-term debt contracts mature probabilistically (Leland, 1998; Chatterjee
and Eyigungor, 2015). Specifically, there is a probability λ that determines the maturity
of each unit of outstanding debt next period. In case, the debt does not mature, there is
an associated coupon payment z. Debt service requires to pay λb for matured portion of
debt and (1 − λ)zb for the periodic coupon payment for the portion of debt that is not
matured. Therefore, total debt service is [λ + (1 − λ)z]b. Debt level of the next period is
denoted b′ where the debt that is not matured in the current period is (1 − λ)b. Hence,
total new issue of bonds is (1 − λ)b − b′ and with bond price q(y, b′), total credit funding
for the consumption is q(y, b′)[(1− λ)b− b′].
Equation (1) will still hold since it does not depend on the maturity structure of bonds.
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Government resource constraint for issuing long-term bonds only is as follows:
c ≤
 y + q(y, b
′)[(1− λ)b− b′] + [λ+ (1− λ)z]b Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.9)
The value function of a sovereign in a state of default is:
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, 0)] (2.10)
Let V c(y, b) be the payoff from repaying the debt which is given by
V c(y, b) = max
{b′,c}
[u(c) + βE{y′|y}V
o(y′, b′)] (2.11)
Finally,
V o(y, b) = max{V c(y, b), V d(y)} (2.12)
The default policy of the government can be characterized by repayment sets and de-
fault sets. LetR(b) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is repayment
when long-term debt is b, such that
R(b) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, b) ≥ vd(y)}
and let D(b) = R̃(b) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is default
for the debt level of b:
D(b) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, b) ≤ vd(y)}
Under competition, a unit bond price satisfies the pricing equations as follows:
q(y, b′) =
1
1 + r∗
∫
R(b′)
[λ+ (1− λ){z + q(y′, b̃′)}]f(y′, y)dy′ (2.13)
where,
b′ = b̃(y, b)
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2.4.3 Sovereign Debt with Multiple Maturity Structure
In this section I assume that the sovereign can issue both short- and long-term bonds as
in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012). The sovereign now start a period with bS level of
short-term bonds and bL level of long-term bonds. There are two prices now- qS(y, b′S, b
′
L)
for short-term bonds and qL(y, b′S, b
′
L) for long-term bonds. The price of short-term bonds
does not only depend on the its own level of debt level chosen for the next period but also
on the long-term debt level b′L. This is because with each unit of bond of any maturity
structure, the default probability of the sovereign goes up and the prices of both short-
and long-term bonds depend on the default probability. Revenue collected from issuing
short-term debt is −qS(y, b′S, b′L)b′S and from long-term debt is qL(y, b′S, b′L)[(1− λ)bL − b′L].
Government resource constraint for issuing both short- and long-term bonds is as fol-
lows:
c ≤
 y − qS(·)b
′
S + qL(·)[(1− λ)bL − b′L] + bS + [λ+ (1− λ)z]bL Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.14)
where, qS(·) = qS(y, b′S, b′L) and qL(·) = qL(y, b′S, b′L).
The value of default is given by:
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, 0, 0)] (2.15)
Let V c(y, bS, bL) be the payoff of the sovereign from repaying the debt which is given
by
V c(y, bS, bL) = max
{b′S ,b
′
L,c}
[u(c) + βE{y′|y}V
o(y′, b′S, b
′
L)] (2.16)
Finally,
V o(y, bS, bL) = max{V c(y, bS, bL), V d(y)} (2.17)
The default policy of the government can be characterized by repayment sets and
default sets. Let R(bS, bL) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is
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repayment when short- and long-term debt are bS and bL, such that
R(bS, bL) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, bS, bL) ≥ vd(y)}
and let D(bS, bL) = R̃(bS, bL) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is
default for the debts level of bS , and bL:
D(bS, bL) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, bS, bL) ≤ vd(y)}
Under competition, a unit bond price satisfies the pricing equations as follows:
qS(y, b
′
S, b
′
L) =
1
1 + r∗
∫
R(b′S ,b
′
L)
f(y′, y)dy′, (2.18)
qL(y, b
′
S, b
′
L) =
1
1 + r∗
∫
R(b′S ,b
′
L)
[λ+ (1− λ){z + qL(y′, b̃′S, b̃′L)}]f(y′, y)dy′ (2.19)
where,
b′S = b̃S(y, bS, bL)
b′L = b̃L(y, bS, bL)
2.4.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I describe the functional forms and set all required parameters to cali-
brate the model. Simulation results follow the calibration of the model.
2.4.4.1 Calibration and Functional Forms
I make the following specifications of functional form and distributional assumptions
for the quantitative analysis:
Utility function: u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ)
Endowment process: ln yt = ρ ln yt−1 + εt, where 0 < ρ < 1 and εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε )
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For the numerical specification of the model we need 9 parameter values. There are
(i) two endowment process parameters, ρ and σ2ε ; (ii) two preference parameters, β and γ;
(iii) two parameters describing the bond, the maturity parameter λ, and the coupon pay-
ment z; (iv) the probability of reentry following default, ξ, and the output cost parameter
during the default, φ(y); and (v) the risk-free rate r∗.
The estimated values of the endowment parameters are ρ = 0.945 and σ2ε = 0.025. Us-
ing a quadrature based procedure (Tauchen and Hussey, 1991), there is a 51-state Markov
chain for the shock. The time preference parameter, β is set to 0.953, and the risk aversion
coefficient, σ is set to 2, which is a standard practice in real business cycle studies. The
value of λ is set to 0.1 so that average maturity becomes 10 quarters. However, according
to OECD, average sovereign bond maturity has risen to almost 8 years or 32 quarters in
2019. Therefore, there is a comparative analysis later with λ = 0.03. Based on the data
on Argentine bonds reported in Broner et al. (2013), the value of z is set to 0.03. The
probability to reenter the financial market after default is set to 0.282. Following Arellano
(2008), the output cost of default, φ(y) is set to 0.969E(y). The risk-free interest rate, r∗
is set to 1.0 percent, corresponding to an annual rate of 4.0 percent, which is the average
nominal yield on three-month US Treasury bills during the period of 1980 to 2001. Table
2.1 summarizes the parameter values.
2.4.4.2 Simulation Results
This section analyzes the bond price schedules, value functions, default probabilities,
simulation results of output, bond issuance, and the associated prices for previously dis-
cussed three methods of bond issuance: only short-term bonds, only long-term bonds,
and both short- and long-term bonds.
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Table 2.1: Parameters
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.953
γ Risk aversion 2
ρ Persistence of output process 0.945
σε Standard deviation of output shock 0.025
λ Reciprocal of average maturity 0.10, 0.03
z Coupon rate of long-term bonds 0.03
ξ Probability of reentry in credit market 0.282
φ(y) Output costs 0.969 E(y)
r∗ Risk-free rate 0.01
Figure 2.2 shows the bond price schedule with respect to the choice of assets, b′ (as ra-
tio of mean output) for two different income shocks with 5 percent below and above trend
while the sovereign issues either short-term bonds or long-term bonds. It is evident from
the figure that there is a sharp decline in bond prices during recessions (low output) for
a small amount of increase in borrowings regardless the maturity structure of bonds, and
the strict borrowing constraint restricts the sovereign from further borrowing after reach-
ing the borrowing capacity. During economic boom, bond prices remain steady for lower
short-term borrowings but decline rapidly for long-term borrowings. However, after a
certain level of borrowing, prices decline moderately for long-term bonds but sharply for
short-term borrowings. As in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), there is a trade-off
between the hedging benefit of long-term debt and the relative incentive benefit of short-
term debt. During economic boom because of shock persistence sovereign is expected
not to default in a short period of time but may default in the long run and therefore,
short-term bonds have more value than long term bonds for small amount of borrow-
ings. Here incentive benefit of short-term debts exceeds the hedging benefit of long-term
debts. However, as borrowing increases, the value of short-term debts and its incentive
benefit reduce sharply and the value is eventually lower than that of long-term debts at
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(a) Only Short-term Bond (b) Only Long-term Bond
Figure 2.2: Bond Price Schedule with Dilution
extreme borrowing level where hedging benefit of long-term debts exceed the incentive
benefit of short-term debts. Therefore, the sovereign can generate more welfare through
short-term bonds when the requirement of borrowing is lower and through long-term
bonds when it is higher.
Figure 2.3 shows the relative comparison of value functions under two different ma-
turity structure of bonds issuance- short-term bonds and long-term bonds when output is
either high or low. During recessions the outcome is the same- after a very small amount
of borrowing default becomes an obvious choice in both the cases. However, during
boom the sovereign can generate higher welfare with long-term debt since the sovereign
can accumulate more borrowings with long-term bonds than with short-term bonds be-
fore it needs to go for default.
Figure 2.4 shows the default probability as function of output, y and choice of bonds
for next period, b′ in heatmap when the sovereign issues short-term bonds or long-term
bonds only. The yellow areas are for default and blue areas represent no default combi-
nation of output, y and bond level next period, b′. The figure shows that default area is
higher for short-term bonds than for long-term bonds largely because of the rollover risk
23
(a) Only Short-term Bond (b) Only Long-term Bond
Figure 2.3: Value Functions with Dilution
(a) Only Short-term Bond (b) Only Long-term Bond
Figure 2.4: Default Probabilities with Dilution
of short-term bonds. In case of short-term bonds, the sovereign needs to roll over the ex-
isting bonds by issuing new bonds whereas rollover is not required in case of long-term
bonds. Therefore, default probability is higher for short-term bonds.
Figure 2.5 shows time series comparison between issuing either short-term bonds or
long-term bonds in terms of output, foreign asset levels and bond price. The gray bars
represent the default periods. The simulation results are almost the same for both the
cases- when output is high and the economy is in boom, the borrowing capacity and
borrowing levels are high with higher bond prices. The opposite case is also true for both
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(a) Only Short-term Bond (b) Only Long-term Bond
Figure 2.5: Simulation Results with Dilution
the cases- when output is low and the economy is in recession, the borrowing capacity
and the borrowing levels are low.
Figure 2.6 shows the short-term bond price schedule when the sovereign issues bonds
with both maturity structure- short-term and long term. The price schedule is shown as a
function of the level of choice of short-term bonds, b′S by the sovereign for the next period,
given levels of output, y and the choice of long-term bonds, b′L. The left panel shows the
price schedule when output is high but long-term bond level is low and when output
is low but level of long-term bond is high. During a recession the sovereign chooses to
default after the price goes to zero after a small amount of bonds issuance. This is also
because the sovereign has high level of long-term bonds already and further borrowing
capacity is low. During economic boom, the price is close to one until debt-to-output ratio
reaches 15 percent after which the price declines rapidly. The right panel shows the price
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.6: Short-term Bond Price Schedule with Dilution
schedule when both output and the level of long-term bonds are either high or low. This is
interesting because the price is higher during a recession than during an economic boom
due to a lower level of long-term bonds which frees up borrowing capacity with short-
term bonds. Even in economic boom the sovereign goes to default with more than 10
percent short-term debt-to-output ratio since the borrowing capacity is low due to higher
level of long-term debts.
Figure 2.7 shows the long-term bond price schedule when the sovereign issues bonds
with both maturity structure- short-term and long term. The price schedule is shown as a
function of the level of choice of long-term bonds, b′L by the sovereign for the next period,
given levels of output, y and the choice of short-term bonds, b′S . The left panel shows the
price schedule when output is high or low but the level of short-term bond is always low.
The price goes down gradually after a certain level of long-term bonds regardless of state
of the economy. However, the price goes down more during recessions which is expected
because of lower borrowing capacity and more default risk. The right panel shows the
price schedule when both output and the level of short-term bonds are either high or
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: Long-term Bond Price Schedule with Dilution
(a) with respect to short-term bond (b) with respect to long-term bond
Figure 2.8: Long-term Bond Price Schedule with Dilution
low. Even the economy in boom, with a high level of short-term debt-to-output ratio, the
sovereign cannot borrow without default after 5 percent long-term debt-to-output ratio.
Figure 2.8 shows the value functions with issuance of bonds of both maturity structure-
short-term and long-term. The left panel shows the value function in term of short-term
bonds when output, y and the level of choice of long-term bonds, b′L are both high or low.
The left panel shows the value function in term of long-term bonds when output, y and
the level of choice of short-term bonds, b′S are both high or low. We do not find any notice-
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Figure 2.9: Simulation Results with Multiple Maturity Structure and Dilution
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able difference in the value functions in terms of the maturity structure of bonds. Hence,
value function is trivial in case of deciding the maturity structure of bond issuance.
Figure 2.9 shows the time series simulation of output, holdings of short-term and long-
term bonds by the sovereign, and their associated prices. When the output is high and
the economy is in boom, the sovereign faces higher borrowing capacity and therefore,
holds higher short-term and long-term bonds. The prices are also high because of lower
default risk during a boom. During the periods of lower output and economic recessions,
the sovereign cannot borrow due to lower borrowing capacity. However, in the periods
when output decreases gradually, the sovereign participates in the credit market with
opposite position on short-term and long-term bonds, i.e., the sovereign buys short-term
bonds while issues long-term bond and vice versa during the period of declining output.
2.5 The Models without Dilution
This section compares different methods of eliminating the dilution problem in sovereign
debt. The dilution problem is only involved with the long-term debt. However, holders of
previously issued long-term debt get worse off regardless the sovereign issues new debt
of any maturity structure. To compare among the methods, in this section, we assume that
the sovereign issues new debt on either maturity structure, i.e., short- or long-term debt.
This will also allow us to focus on the differences of social welfare among the methods.
2.5.1 Compensation Covenant with Long-term Bonds
As in Hatchondo et al. (2016), this section proposes a compensation covenant which
specifies that if the sovereign would like borrow more, it has to pay the difference between
the observed bond price, q(y, b′) and the counterfactual bond price, q(y, (1 − λ)b) that
would have been observed without any new borrowing by the sovereign in the current
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period to each holder of previously issued long-term bonds. This covenant makes the
long-term bonds value independent of any borrowing in the future by the sovereign and
thereby reduces the debt dilution problem.
The payment specified in the covenant is given by
C(y, b, b′) = max{q(y, (1− λ)b)− q(y, b′), 0} (2.20)
The government’s budget constraint reads as
c ≤
 y + q(y, b
′)[(1− λ)b− b′] + [λ+ (1− λ)z]b+ (1− λ)b C(y, b, b′) Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.21)
Without the dilution problem of sovereign debt through a compensation covenant for
the existing bondholders before the sovereign can issue new bonds, there is a new term
in the sovereign’s budget constraint- (1 − λ)b C(y, b, b′) which implies that the sovereign
must compensate the existing bondholders (1 − λ) portion of bonds with C(y, b, b′). So,
the total compensation becomes (1− λ)b C(y, b, b′).
The price of a bond is given by
q(y, b′) =
1
1 + r∗
E{y′|y}
[
[1− d(y′, b′)][λ+ (1− λ){z + q(y′, b̃′) + C(y′, b′, b̃′}]
]
Price of long-term bonds also adjusts the expected compensation C(y′, b′, b̃′ in case of
new borrowings by the sovereign in future.
The lifetime utility of a sovereign in a state of default is:
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, 0)] (2.22)
The payoff of the sovereign from repaying the debt, denoted V c(y, b), is given by
V c(y, b) = max
{b′,c}
[u(c) + βE{y′|y}V
o(y′, b′)] (2.23)
Finally,
V o(y, b) = max{V c(y, b), V d(y)} (2.24)
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(a) Price with Dilution (b) Price without Dilution
Figure 2.10: Long-term Bond Price Schedule with Dilution
2.5.1.1 Results
This section presents results in terms of bond prices, value functions, default proba-
bilities, and simulation of output and foreign assets with the prices when the sovereign
issues only long-term bonds with a compensation covenant as a solution to the debt di-
lution problem. This section also compares the results with the results when the debt
dilution problem exists, i.e., without a compensation covenant for the existing bondhold-
ers.
Figure 2.10 shows the bond price schedule with dilution and without dilution with
respect to the choice of new debt level under two output levels- high and low, when the
sovereign issues only long-term bonds. The price schedule is pretty similar in both the
cases. During low output period the bond prices go down sharply for a small amount
of increase in borrowing and soon go close to zero. During economic boom the prices
go down moderately and the difference is insignificant to observe visually. We will see
the difference later when we compare the average prices with and without the dilution
problem.
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(a) Value Functions with Dilution (b) Value Functions without Dilution
Figure 2.11: Value Functions Comparison
(a) Default Probability with Dilution (b) Default Probability without Dilution
Figure 2.12: Default Probabilities Comparison
Figure 2.11 shows the value functions with dilution and without dilution with respect
to the debt level under two output levels- high and low, when the sovereign issues only
long-term bonds. The value functions are pretty similar in both the cases. During low
output period the value functions go down sharply for a small amount of increase in bor-
rowing and soon become flat due to default decision by the sovereign. During economic
boom the value functions go down moderately and the sovereign can borrow more before
going for a default decision. The difference is insignificant to observe visually though.
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(a) Simulation Results with Dilution (b) Simulation Results without Dilution
Figure 2.13: Simulation Results Comparison with Long-term Bonds
Figure 2.12 shows the default probabilities with dilution and without dilution with
respect to the choice of new debt levels and the levels of output, when the sovereign issues
only long-term bonds. The default probabilities are pretty similar visually in both the
cases. We will see the difference later when we compare the average default probabilities
with and without the dilution problem.
Figure 2.13 shows the simulation results of output, foreign assets, and bond prices
with and without dilution, when the sovereign issues only long-term bonds. The results
are pretty similar in both the cases. During low output period the bond prices go down
and due to lower borrowing capacity borrowing also goes down. During economic boom
the prices go up along with the borrowing due to higher borrowing capacity.
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2.5.2 Compensation Covenant with Multiple Maturity Structure
In this section I assume that the sovereign can issue both short- and long-term bonds
with a compensation covenant in the contract of long-term bonds. The compensation now
depends on current period starting and next period levels of short- and long-term debts
besides the stochastic income y. Others are as before.
The payment specified in the covenant is given by
C(y, bS, bL, b′S, b′L) = max{q(y, bS, (1− λ)bL)− q(y, b′S, b′L), 0} (2.25)
Government resource constraint is as follows:
c ≤
 y − qS(·)b
′
S + qL(·)[(1− λ)bL − b′L] + bS + [λ+ (1− λ)z]bL + ΓC(·) Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.26)
where,
qS(·) = qS(y, b′S, b′L)
qL(·) = qL(y, b′S, b′L), and
ΓC(·) = (1− λ)bLC(y, bS, bL, b′S, b′L)
The lifetime sovereign utility in default is given by:
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, 0, 0)] (2.27)
The payoff of the sovereign from repaying the debt, denoted V c(y, bS, bL), is given by
V c(y, bS, bL) = max
{b′S ,b
′
L,c}
[u(c) + βE{y′|y}V
o(y′, b′S, b
′
L)] (2.28)
Finally,
V o(y, bS, bL) = max{V c(y, bS, bL), V d(y)} (2.29)
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The default policy of the government can be characterized by repayment sets and
default sets. Let R(bS, bL) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is
repayment when short- and long-term debt are bS and bL, such that
R(bS, bL) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, bS, bL) ≥ vd(y)}
and let D(bS, bL) = R̃(bS, bL) be the set of income levels for which the optimal decision is
default for the debts level of bS , and bL:
D(bS, bL) = {y ∈ Y : vc(y, bS, bL) ≤ vd(y)}
Under competition, a unit bond price satisfies the pricing equations as follows:
qS(y, b
′
S, b
′
L) =
1
1 + r∗
∫
R(b′S ,b
′
L)
f(y′, y)dy′,
(2.30)
qL(y, b
′
S, b
′
L) =
1
1 + r∗
∫
R(b′S ,b
′
L)
[λ+ (1− λ){z + qL(y′, b̃′S, b̃′L) + C(y′, b′S, b′L, b̃′S, b̃′L)}]f(y′, y)dy′
(2.31)
where,
b′S = b̃S(y, bS, bL)
b′L = b̃L(y, bS, bL)
2.5.2.1 Results
This section presents results in terms of bond prices, value functions, default proba-
bilities, and simulation of output and foreign assets with the prices when the sovereign
issues only both short- and long-term bonds with a compensation covenant as a remedy
to the debt dilution problem.
Figure 2.14 shows the short-term bond price schedule when the sovereign issues bonds
with both maturity structure- short-term and long term with a compensation covenant as
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.14: Short-term Bond Price Schedule without Dilution
a remedy to the debt dilution problem. The price schedule is shown as a function of the
level of choice of short-term bonds, b′S by the sovereign for the next period, given lev-
els of output, y and the choice of long-term bonds, b′L. The left panel shows the price
schedule when output is high but the long-term bond level is low and when output is
low but the level of long-term bond is high. During a recession the sovereign chooses to
default after the price goes to zero after a small amount of bonds issuance. This is also
because the sovereign has high level of long-term bonds already and further borrowing
capacity is low. During economic boom, the price is close to one. The right panel shows
the price schedule when output and the level of long-term bonds are either high or low
together. This is interesting because the price is higher during a recession than during
an economic boom due to a lower level of long-term bonds which frees up borrowing
capacity with short-term bonds. Even in economic boom the sovereign goes to default
with more than 15 percent short-term debt-to-output ratio since the borrowing capacity
is low due to higher level of long-term debts.
Figure 2.15 shows the long-term bond price schedule when the sovereign issues bonds
with both maturity structure- short-term and long-term with a compensation covenant.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.15: Long-term Bond Price Schedule without Dilution
The price schedule is shown as a function of the level of choice of long-term bonds, b′L
by the sovereign for the next period, given levels of output, y and the choice of short-
term bonds, b′S . The left panel shows the price schedule when output is high or low but
the level of short-term bond is always low. The price goes down gradually after a certain
level of long-term bonds during a recession which is expected because of lower borrowing
capacity and more default risk. The prices are very close to one for 20 percent long-term
debt-to-output ratio and go down afterwards. The right panel shows the price schedule
when output is high but the level of short-term debt is low and when output is low but
the level of short-term debt is high. During economic recessions when output is low,
the sovereign does not have any borrowing capacity due to high short-term borrowing.
During economic boom when output is high, the sovereign can issue significant amount
of long-term bonds without a major price discount if the level of issuance of short-term
bonds is low.
Figure 2.16 shows the value functions with respect to the debt level under two output
levels- high and low, when the sovereign issues both short- and long-term bonds with a
compensation covenant to mitigate the debt dilution problem. The left panel shows the
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(a) With respect to short-term bond (b) With respect to long-term bond
Figure 2.16: Value Functions without Dilution
value functions with respect to short-term bonds and the right panel shows the value
functions with respect to long-term bonds. The value functions are pretty similar in
both the cases. During low output period the value functions go down sharply for a
small amount of increase in borrowing and soon become flat due to default decision by
the sovereign. During economic boom the value functions go down moderately and the
sovereign can borrow more. The difference is insignificant to observe visually though.
Figure 2.17 shows the time series simulation of output, holdings of short-term and
long-term bonds by the sovereign, and their associated prices when bond issuance comes
with a compensation covenant. When the output is high and the economy is in boom, the
sovereign faces higher borrowing capacity and therefore, holds higher short-term and
long-term bonds. The prices are also high because of lower default risk during a boom.
During the periods of lower output and economic recessions, the sovereign cannot bor-
row due to lower borrowing capacity. However, in the periods when output decreases
gradually, the sovereign participates in the credit market with opposite position on short-
term and long-term bonds, i.e., the sovereign buys short-term bonds while issues long-
term bond and vice versa during the period of declining output.
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Figure 2.17: Simulation Results without Dilution for Multiple Maturity Structure
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2.6 Comparative Analysis
Table 2.2 compares the models discussed in terms of the averages of default proba-
bility, short-term price, and long-term price when the value of λ is equal to 0.10. From
table 2.2 it is evident that average default probability is the highest and therefore, aver-
age bond price is the lowest with only short-term bonds. Default probabilities go down
when the sovereign has a probabilistic maturity structure for the bonds. In this type of
bonds, average prices go up if the sovereign decides to include a compensation covenant
in the bond contract that requires sovereign to compensate the existing bondholders be-
fore the government can issue new bonds. The default probability further goes down if
the sovereign issues both short- and long-term bonds. There are also significant increases
in the bond prices as well. If the sovereign has a compensation covenant while issuing
bonds with both the maturity structures then price for long-term bonds goes up while,
interestingly enough, short-term bonds experience a decline in the price. This is largely
because short-term bondholders do not get any compensation if the government decides
to issue new bonds. Short-term bondholders either get the face value of the bond back
in case of repayment or get nothing in case of default by the sovereign at the maturity of
the bond. Moreover, default probability goes up with the inclusion of the compensation
covenant in the bond contract and short-term bond price is largely related to the default
probability of the sovereign.
Figure 2.18 shows the effect of compensation covenant on prices of long-term bonds on
the left panel and short-term bonds on the right panel. Due to the compensation covenant
the lenders would like to increase the supply of long-term bonds while decrease the sup-
ply of short-term bonds. From the result of long-term bond price with compensation
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Table 2.2: Comparative Results (λ = 0.10)
Model Avg. δ Avg. qS Avg. qL
Only Short-term Bond 0.299 0.694 -
Only Long-term Bond 0.268 - 0.758
Only Long-term Bond & Compensation 0.268 - 0.812
Bonds with Multiple Maturity 0.193 0.799 0.859
Bonds with Multiple Maturity & Compensation 0.206 0.786 0.910
Figure 2.18: Effects of Compensation Covenant on Prices
covenant we can infer that the demand for long-term bonds also goes up. This makes
the overall price increase for long-term bonds. The demand for short-term bonds goes
down resulting in the lower price of short-term bonds. Finally, since the default proba-
bility depends on the levels of bonds, the increase in long-term bonds is higher than the
decrease in short-term bonds which is consistent to the higher default probability with
compensation covenant when λ = 0.10.
According to OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2019, the average sovereign debt
maturity is 8 years. Therefore, we need to increase the maturity of long-term bonds in
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Table 2.3: Comparative Results (λ = 0.03)
Model Avg. δ Avg. qS Avg. qL
Only Short-term Bond 0.299 0.694 -
Only Long-term Bond 0.243 - 0.919
Only Long-term Bond & Compensation 0.245 - 1.067
Bonds with Multiple Maturity 0.210 0.782 0.982
Bonds with Multiple Maturity & Compensation 0.173 0.819 1.233
out model to compare the results with those of lower maturity debts (λ = 0.10). Table 2.3
compares the models discussed in terms of the averages of default probability, short-term
price, and long-term price when the value of λ is equal to 0.03. From table 2.3 it is evident
that default probabilities go down when the sovereign has a probabilistic maturity struc-
ture for the bonds. Comparing with table 2.2, it is also evident that the default probability
goes down to 24.3 percent from 26.8 percent with an increase in the average maturity of
long-term bonds from 10 periods to 33 periods. Long-term prices also improve in case
of both with and without compensation covenant with an increase in the average matu-
rity of bonds. In fact, when the sovereign issues both the short- and long-term bonds,
the average price of long-term bonds goes over one, allowing the sovereign to issue pre-
mium bonds. Two other interesting findings are the improvement of both the average
default probability and the average short-term bond price after the inclusion of the com-
pensation covenant when the average maturity of long-term bonds is high (λ = 0.03).
When the average maturity of long-term bonds is low (λ = 0.10), the average default
probability goes up from 19.3 percent to 20.6 percent after inclusion of the compensation
covenant. However, with a sufficiently large maturity (λ = 0.03), the default probability
goes down to 17.3 percent from 21 percent after including the compensation covenant
when the sovereign issues both short- and long-term bonds. With the increase of the
maturity of long-term bonds, the average price of short-term bonds goes down to 0.782
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from 0.799 without the compensation covenant in the model of bonds with both maturity
structure. However, with inclusion of the compensation covenant, the average short-term
price, in fact, goes up from 0.786 to 0.819. This confirms that the compensation covenant
solves the debt dilution problem in a larger scale if the maturity of long-term bonds is
sufficiently high.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Maturity structure plays an important role in sovereign debt. Moreover, a sovereign’s
lack of commitment to the action of future governments regarding future borrowing and
default give birth to the debt-dilution problem and eventually long-term bonds become
costly. In the calibrated model I show that short-term bonds do not face the debt dilution
problem since the sovereign issues such bonds only once in a period. However, rollover
crisis is higher in case of short-term bonds. I also show that default frequency and debt-
dilution problem reduce significantly when the sovereign issues both short- and long-
term bonds.
Debt dilution problem has several remedies, such as, compensation package for the
existing bondholders (Hatchondo et al., 2016) or a seniority arrangement for the bond-
holders (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2015). However, none of these solutions are com-
prehensive to protect the bondholders completely from higher default probability of the
sovereign due to raising the debt level. With the compensation covenant in multiple
maturity structure in debt issuance, the existing creditors will be compensated before
any new issuance of bonds by the sovereign. This mechanism has twofold benefits.
First, it provides the existing creditors a compensation during further borrowing by the
sovereign. Second, it reduces the default risk when the maturity of long-term bonds is
sufficiently high.
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Future direction of research would be improving these covenants by specifying the ex-
act compensation packages and bargaining protocols for the bondholders. Endogenizing
the maturity of long-term bonds would be another possible interesting work. Moreover,
it would be worthwhile to see these cases under both Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) baseline
framework and Cole and Kehoe (2000) self-fulfilling rollover crises.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 The Model with Debt Threshold
A debt threshold covenant requires the sovereign to compensate the holders of each
previously issued long-term bonds the difference between the new debt level and a debt
threshold before issuing any new debt. This covenant penalizes the sovereign for new
borrowing and thus induces a lower debt level. This covenant eliminates the debt dilu-
tion problem because the creditors are assured at the beginning of the contract that before
the sovereign can borrow from the international credit market, they will get their com-
pensation equal to the new debt level after new borrowings and a certain debt threshold,
b̄. Thus, the the new compensation covenant is given by
Cb(b′) = ψmax{b̄− b′, 0} (2.32)
Except this debt threshold compensation, everything is the same as in the section where
there is a discussion of the model without debt dilution.
2.9.2 The Model with Price Threshold
In price threshold covenant the creditors do not need to depend on the counterfactual
price of bonds that would be observed without any new debt issuance in a period. The
covenant, rather, specifies a compensation for the creditors for a decline in the price of
bonds from a certain threshold. This price threshold requires the sovereign to pay the
holders of previously issued long-term bonds the difference between a constant threshold
price, q̄ and the market price of long-term bonds after new issuance, q(y, b′). Thus, the
promised compensation in the price threshold covenants of long-term bonds is
Cq(y, b, b′) =
 max{q̄ − q(y, b
′), 0} if b′ < (1− λ)b
0 Otherwise
(2.33)
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2.9.3 The Model with Income Contingent Debt
The government’s budget constraint reads as
c ≤
 y + [λ+ (1− λ)z]b+ E{y′|y}{q(y, b
′(y′))[(1− λ)b− b′(y′)]} Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.34)
where,
b′(y′) ≤ b̄′(y′) = sup{b̃′ : V c(y′, b̃′) ≥ V d(y′) ∀y}
The lifetime sovereign utility in default is given by:
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, 0)] (2.35)
The payoff of the sovereign from repaying the debt, denoted V c(y, b), is given by
V c(y, b) = max
{b′(y′),c}
[u(c) + βE{y′|y}V
o(y′, b′(y′))] (2.36)
Finally,
V o(y, b) = max{V c(y, b), V d(y)} (2.37)
2.9.4 The Sovereign Debt with Settlement
Government resource constraint will still hold.
c ≤
 y − qS(·)b
′
S + qL(·)[(1− λ)bL − b′L] + bS + [λ+ (1− λ)z]bL Repayment
y − φ(y) Default
(2.38)
where, qS(·) = qS(y, b′S, b′L) and qL(·) = qL(y, b′S, b′L).
The sovereign’s lifetime utility in default is given by:
V d(y) = u(y − φ(y)) + βE{y′|y}[(1− ξ)V d(y′) + ξV o(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′)] (2.39)
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The payoff of the sovereign from repaying the debt, V c(y, bS, bL), and finally, V o(y, bS, bL)
will still be the same. The payoff of the sovereign from repaying the debt, denoted
V c(y, bS, bL), is given by
V c(y, bS, bL) = max
{b′S ,b
′
L,c}
[u(c) + βE{y′|y}V
o(y′, b′S, b
′
L)] (2.40)
Finally,
V o(y, bS, bL) = max{V c(y, bS, bL), V d(y)} (2.41)
With some abuse of notation, the default decision rule of the sovereign, d(y, bS, bL) is
implicitly determined by this equation, where d = 1 means default is the optimal decision
and 0 otherwise.
Under competition, the pricing equations of a unit bond are as follows:
qS(y, b
′
S, b
′
L) =
1
1 + r∗
E{y′|y}
[
[1− d(y′, b′S, b′L)] + d(y′, b′S, b′L)
PS(y
′, GS(y
′), GL(y
′))
−b′S
]
(2.42)
qL(y, b
′
S, b
′
L) =
1
1 + r∗
E{y′|y}
[
[1− d(y′, b′S, b′L)][λ+ (1− λ){z + qL(y′, b̃′S, b̃′L)}] (2.43)
+d(y′, b′S, b
′
L)
PL(y
′, GS(y
′), GL(y
′))
−b′L
]
where, as in previous section,
b′S = b̃S(y, bS, bL)
b′L = b̃L(y, bS, bL)
and, PS(y,GS(y), GL(y)) and PL(y,GS(y), GL(y)) are the aggregate values of expected re-
payments on the defaulted short- and long-term debts conditional on output being y and,
settlement values are GS(y) and GL(y), respectively for short- and long-term debts. Since
the aggregate values are equally distributed across all bonds in each maturity class, in
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expectation, each short-term bond will receive E{y′|y}PS(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′))/b′S and each
long-term bond will receive E{y′|y}PL(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′))/b′L.
PS(y,GS(y), GL(y)) and PL(y,GS(y), GL(y)) are given by:
PS(y,GS(y), GL(y)) =
1
1 + r∗
E{y′|y}
[
(1− ξ)PS(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′)) (2.44)
+ξqS(y
′, GS(y
′), GL(y
′))(−GS(y′))
]
PL(y,GS(y), GL(y)) =
1
1 + r∗
E{y′|y}
[
(1− ξ)PL(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′)) (2.45)
+ξqL(y
′, GS(y
′), GL(y
′))(−GL(y′))
]
In case, settlement is reached between the sovereign and the creditors next period, then
the creditors as groups receive settlement with aggregate values of qS(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′))
(−GS(y′)) for short-term bonds and qL(y′, GS(y′), GL(y′))(−GL(y′)) for long-term bonds.
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CHAPTER 3. INTERBANK LIQUIDITY CRISIS AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTAGION
Mohammad Nurul Hasan and Jiaoting Shi
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to the Journal of International Economics
3.1 Abstract
Financially integrated economies observe a cross-country credit boom prior to finan-
cial recessions and a bust afterwards. This chapter presents a two-country real busi-
ness cycle model with banking sector where privately known intermediation efficiency
of banks make them heterogeneous and gives rise to an interbank market. Overaccu-
mulation of assets or low productivity in one country may lead to credit freeze in both
financially integrated countries due to the existence of moral hazard and asymmetric in-
formation in the interbank market. A “sail together” financial integration may go into a
“sink together” interbank credit freeze.
JEL Classification: E44, F34, F41, G01, G15, G21
Keywords: Financial integration, interbank market, asset accumulation, productivity,
moral hazard, asymmetric information, credit freeze.
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3.2 Introduction
Recent macroeconomic literature has emphasized on the propagation and amplifi-
cation of random adverse financial shocks which primarily causes the banking crises
(Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, 2015). However, recent studies on banking crises has high-
lighted a close linkage between such crises and credit conditions (Gorton, 2010, 2012).
Recent empirical research also corroborate the existence of typical patterns across diverse
episodes. There are closed economy models of banking crises (Gertler and Kiyotaki,
2015; Boissay et al., 2016). However, in a financially integrated world, banking crises
may propagate and affect other countries. Banking crises are rare events, they follow
credit-intensive booms, and involve with multiple nations occasionally. These stylized
facts therefore call for an alternative approach of banking crises.
When countries are financially integrated, the interbank market equilibrium may be
different from that of a closed economy. Moreover, the interbank crises may result from
the states of other countries and therefore the threshold level of the states may also vary
for crises. A financially integrated world may lead to spillover effects of banking crises
from one country to another. These ideas lead to the research questions: how does the
interbank market operate in a financially integrated two-country model? When do coun-
tries face inter-banking crises in an integrated world? and is there any spillover effect of
inter-banking crises from one country to another? In this paper, we seek for the answers
of these questions under a two-country model.
In this chapter , when two countries are integrated through interbank lending, bank-
ing crises result from the procyclicality of bank balance sheets of either/both of the coun-
tries and may have spillover effects of interbank market freeze on each other. Countries
get financially integrated to “sail together” and survive during recessions. However, due
to overaccumulaion by one country both the countries may fall into an interbank freeze to
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“sink together”. During expansions, credit supply increases pushing both the corporate
and interbank lending rates down. With lower rates the agency problem in the interbank
market gets aggravated leading to contractions in interbank funding. Financial integra-
tion may lead to a disastrous interbank market freeze if total credit boom is larger than
the productive use of loans.
In our model, we follow the real business cycle setup with heterogeneous banks as
in Boissay et al. (2016). However, we have a two-country world where the countries are
symmetric. Banks are heterogeneous due to the privately observed intermediation ef-
ficiency. They can obtain funds from the depositor/shareholders and/or the interbank
market and lend to homogeneous good producing firms. Due to the usual agency prob-
lem in the interbank market, banks can borrow and divert funds to lower return assets
and such diversion cannot either traced or recovered by the lending banks. Less efficient
banks have more incentive to divert, and this diversion depends on the rate of returns
in the economy. To restrict such diversion, interbank market has a borrowing capacity
resulting from the incentive compatibility constraint. However, lower return in the cor-
porate loans market increases the incentive for diversion and therefore market responds
through lowering the borrowing capacity and eventually the market goes into a freeze.
In a financially integrated world freeze in one country leads to freeze in another country
for lower rates of returns.
The mechanism that leads to a banking crises in a two-country world is as follows.
A sequence of favorable, productivity shocks lead to an expansion of credit. The more
efficient banks borrow from the less efficient ones to expand their corporate loan opera-
tions. The size of the overall banking sector increases and the economy booms. However,
when the aggregate productivity growth goes down to converge to its average course,
the demand for corporate loans and the corresponding rate goes down. As a result, the
interbank lending rate goes down resulting into more incentive for less efficient banks
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to borrow and divert funds. Therefore, counterparty risk goes up since the identity of
these diverting banks are unknown; interbank lending declines and the market goes into
a freeze. When two countries are integrated through interbank lending, a market freeze
in one country leads to a freeze in another country as well. Either two countries have an
operating interbank market or both goes into a freeze. Excessive credit creation by one
country triggers a two-country wide credit freeze. The countries may also go into a freeze
from very low productivity in either or both of the countries.
We calibrate the interbank market equilibrium of the model and assess its quantita-
tive properties. Potentially, the model can generate banking crises in one country due
to an endogenous factor- overaccumulation of assets or an exogenous factor- low pro-
ductivity or a combination of both the endogenous and exogenous factors in a period.
Moreover, the banking crises in one country shows a spillover effect on another country,
i.e., a country that could have a well operating interbank market without any integra-
tion, falls into interbank market freeze due to either of the factors of another country after
any financial integration. Thus, as in data, banking crises in one country in our model are
closely linked to asset accumulation and productivity of not only its own but also another
country to which the country is financially integrated. However, we find that this story
largely depends on how the countries are integrated, e.g., when households are allowed
to deposit in domestic country only, countries are integrated through only the interbank
market, and firms can only borrow capital from the domestic banks.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.3 depicts some related literature of macroe-
conomic models with financial frictions, and international spillover effect, contagion. Sec-
tion 3.4 documents the facts about financial recessions of 14 OECD countries for the pe-
riod 1870-2008 as in Boissay et al. (2016). Section 3.5 describes the basic model with rep-
resentative household, representative firm, and heterogeneous banks. Section 3.6 charac-
terizes the interbank market equilibrium for both closed and financially integrated two
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countries those are integrated in different dimensions. Section 3.7, presents the quan-
titative analysis and the results of the interbank market equilibrium to alternative state
spaces. Section 3.8 concludes the paper.
3.3 Related Literature
This chapter is related to the macroeconomic literature with financial frictions. For
instance, Bernanke et al. (1999), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
and Christiano et al. (2014) show how financial market frictions can amplify the financial
shocks and generate long-lasting recessions. However, the models are linearized in this
class of research and this paper departs from this approach to characterize the important
and critical nonlinearities in the mechanism of the interbank market. The important dif-
ference is to show the boom-bust cycle as an outcome of endogenous factors rather than
of a big financial shock only.
In this respect, this chapter is related to the literature featuring powerful amplification
mechanism1 resulting from financial frictions, e.g., He and Krishnamurthy (2012), and
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). This chapter is also related to the literature on sudden
stops in emerging market economies. For example, as in Mendoza and Smith (2006) and
Mendoza (2010), we find that a standard (mild) productivity shock can trigger a crisis if
the agent is highly leveraged. These are also open economy models similar to our model.
However, this chapter departs in that it does not have exogenous interest rate; rather
endogenous model driven interest rates which play a central role in the mechanism of the
interbank market equilibrium.
1Financial crises are inherently nonlinear events, often featuring sudden plummet in asset prices and
sharp collapse in output, while with a slow recovery rate. The most recent approach to capture this nonlin-
earity is to allow for an occasionally binding constraint.
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This chapter is relevant to the literature that study the financial fragility due to pecu-
niary externalities, such as Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) or Bianchi (2011). These papers
focus on creation of excess credit demand due to financial frictions affecting nonfinancial
firms. In this chapter we focus on excess supply of credit instead where the household
fails to internalize the effect of her saving decisions on both the interbank lending rate
and the corporate lending rate.
This chapter is also related to the financial contagion literature for international mar-
ket. For example, Calvo (1998) and Chang and Velasco (2001), among others, study the
interaction of the banking system and currency markets in a crisis. However, we do not
introduce any currency market; rather the crisis spreads out from one country to another
through the banking channel. Allen and Gale (2000), and Perri and Quadrini (2018) study
the financial contagion as an outcome of liquidity preference shock. Perri and Quadrini
(2018) show that in a two-country model with financial frictions, a global liquidity short-
age induced by pessimistic self-fulfilling expectations can quantitatively generate longer
and deeper recessions following credit booms. The main differences between theirs and
our work are that they focus on balance sheet effect from the private sector, i.e., the role
of balance sheets in constraining borrowers from spending when financial markets are
imperfect, while our work highlights the role of the wholesale banking sector at the heart
of the recent financial crisis in which credit dried up and market froze.2
A recent work3 of Gertler et al. (2019) incorporates banking panics into a standard
New Keynesian model and captures both qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of fi-
nancial collapse on investment, output, and employment. They show that a credit boom
can increase financial instability of the system, as in Boissay et al. (2016). The sudden and
2See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Curdia and Woodford (2010)for pa-
pers that incorporate banking and Iacoviello (2005), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2017) for papers that included household debt.
3See also, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016).
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discrete nature of the financial collapse characterized by the paper is induced without ob-
serving large exogenous productivity shocks, either. Instead, banks that hold imperfectly
liquid long term assets and issue short term debts facing liquidity mismatch are vulnera-
ble to panic failure of household to roll over deposits. A plausible magnitude of negative
capital quality shock reduces the value of banker’s capital, which either brings banks im-
mediately into insolvency, or leads to a self-fulling rollover crisis in which the liquidation
of assets at firesale prices forces banks into default, similar to the Cole and Kehoe (2000)
model of sovereign default but contrast with the “early withdrawal” mechanism in the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model4. One of their paper’s contributions to the macro-
finance literature is that they show that banking panics (or bank runs) are quantitatively
more important than non-linearities coming from occasionally binding constraints, as in
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and He and Krishnamurthy (2012). They also manage
to endogenize the probability of bank runs by relating it to macroeconomic fundamentals.
However, there are three main weaknesses associated with Gertler et al. (2019). First, it is
not clear what the negative capital quality shocks stand for in the model if we are trying
to understand the interactions between the financial market and the real economy. Sec-
ond, the paper tends to replicate what happened during the 2007-08 financial crisis but
fails to match the exact timing of when the crisis occurred. This issue may be addressed
by incorporating some adjustment cost. Third, their model generates a counterfactual
faster recovery rate from the recession than in the data. The lack of persistence may be
resolved by assigning an equally important role to the real side of the economy in which
household deleverages as well in the crisis.
4The traditional bank run models, starting from Diamond and Dybvig (1983), focus on the retail banking
sector in which a “sequential service constraint” takes in effect to generate runs, i.e., only households who
get to banks early will have their money back, a first-come, first-serve scenario. However, recent bank
run mostly occurs in the wholesale banking (or interbank market) sector, such as the failure of Continental
Illinois in 1984 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
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3.4 Financial Recession Facts
Based on data from Jordà et al. (2011, 2013) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) of 14
OECD countries from 1870 to 2008, there are two facts (first two) regarding the financial
recessions. The data for the third fact is taken from Bank for International Settlements
(BIS).
3.4.1 Fact 1: Financial recessions are rare events
Financial recessions are rare events in comparison to other recessions. From data col-
lected of 196 recessions of 14 OECD countries, average probability of a financial recession
is 2.36 percent whereas other recessions have an average probability of 8.93 percent.
3.4.2 Fact 2: Financial recessions follow credit booms
Financial recessions do not hit at a random; rather break out during credit boom.
Credit is 3.25 percent above the trend in the peak year prior to a financial recession in
comparison to only 0.61 percent above the trend in case of other recessions.
3.4.3 Fact 3: International financial recessions follow international credit booms
International financial recessions follow an increase of international credit by more
than 8 percent from the average in the peak year prior to the recession and during the fi-
nancial recession the international credit decreases by almost 13 percent from the average.
Figure 3.1 shows an international credit boom before the financial crisis of 2008.
57
Figure 3.1: International Bank Claims Growth
3.5 The Baseline Model
This section explains a symmetric two-country (j = 1, 2) Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model with banking sector. Each country is populated with one risk averse representa-
tive household, one risk-neutral representative competitive firm, and risk-neutral, hetero-
geneous, and competitive banks with a mass one. For ease of notation, we will exclude
any country subscripts for symmetric country characterization; country notations will be
introduced when required.
3.5.1 The Representative Household
There is an infinitely lived, risk averse, representative household in each of the coun-
tries. Household in each country has preferences over consumption, c, with an utility
function
Et
∞∑
τ=0
βτu(ct+τ ) (3.1)
where, the usual regularity conditions are satisfied (i.e., u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, u′(0) =∞,
u′(∞) = 0), the psychological discount factor of the household is denoted β ∈ (0, 1) which
is not country-specific, and Et(·) denotes the expectation operator. The household starts
each period t with an individual asset a. Aggregate assets are denoted A. We can think a
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as either bank equity or bank deposit and the composition of a is indeterminate due to the
lack of friction between the household and the banks. We refer a as the bank deposit and
assume that the gross return on deposits is denoted r. Following the macro-finance liter-
ature (e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011), we assume that house-
hold cannot finance the firms directly due to the frictions between them. We also assume
that the supply of labor is inelastically one unit by the household who earns unit wage w
for labor, obtains firm profit π, and receives a lump-sum transfer χ corresponding to the
financial intermediation cost of the banks (more explanations are in the banking sector
section). A representative household therefore maximizes her utility (3.1) by deciding on
her consumption/saving subject to the budget constraint
c+ a′ = ra+ w + π + χ (3.2)
3.5.2 The Representative Firm
This is a two-country model where the firm lives only for a period and produces a ho-
mogeneous good that can be either consumed or invested. To produce the good the firm
needs to hire capital k and labor h. The production function zF (k, h) follows a constant re-
turns to scale technology and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. The countries may
differ due to their country-specific total factor productivity (TFP) shocks, z. However,
TFP in both countries are assumed to follow the same exogenous AR(1) process:
log z′ = ρz log z + ε
′ (3.3)
where the persistence parameter |ρz| < 1 and the innovation ε is normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviation σz. At the beginning of period t, ε is realized,
before the firm decides on the requirement of capital k and labor h. At the beginning of
the period t, firm is born without any resources and depends on banks to borrow capital
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k at a gross corporate loan rate R. Capital k depreciates at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). At the end of
the period, the firm repays the corporate loan. For production, the firm also rents labor
from the household and in return pays w per unit of labor. The firm chooses capital, k
and labor, h for production to maximize profit,
π = zF (k, h) + (1− δ)k −Rk − wh (3.4)
3.5.3 The Banking Sector
The banking sector plays a very significant role in this model due to two salient fea-
tures. First, there is heterogeneity in the intermediation skill among banks, i.e., some
banks have more intermediation skill than others. This heterogeneity among banks cre-
ates an interbank market where the least efficient banks lend to the most efficient ones.
Second, following the corporate finance literature (e.g., Tirole, 2006), there is moral haz-
ard problem in the banking sector along with asymmetric information, which essentially
impede the interbank market functioning. Overall, banks perform both the retail bank-
ing and wholesale banking. On the retail side, they collect deposits from the household
and lend to the firms, and on the wholesale side, they issue interbank claims to reallocate
assets among themselves where low skilled banks lend to the high skilled ones.
3.5.3.1 Banks
There is a continuum of risk-neutral, competitive banks in both countries. They are
born at the end of period t − 1 and only live for one period, i.e., banks die at the end of
period t. Each bank, after birth, collects deposit a from the household. They then become
heterogeneous by drawing a random, bank-specific, intermediation skill p. Henceforth,
we denote bank p as bank with intermediation skill p. The skill p is distributed over
the interval [0, 1] with cumulative distribution µ(p), satisfying µ(0) = 0, µ(1) = 1, and
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µ′(p) > 0. If the bank p decides to lend to the firm, then at the end of the period there is an
intermediation cost (1 − p)R per unit of corporate loan, so that bank p earns an effective
gross return of pR from corporate loan.
To avoid any deadweight losses in the economy, household receives a lump-sum re-
bate χ, which is essentially equal to the intermediation cost. These intermediation costs
may arise from the prospection, screening, and monitoring while originating or servicing
the loan. The banks can also invest into an outside project with a constant gross return γ.
For fixing the idea, we refer this outside option as the storage technology which is at least
as good as just letting the good depreciate, i.e., γ ≥ 1− δ.
Due to the heterogeneity of banks in terms of intermediation skill p, in each country
there is an intraperiodic interbank market, where low p banks lend to the high p ones at
gross rate ρ. In equilibrium, this interbank loan rate must be lower than the corporate
loan rate R; otherwise all banks would find it optimal to lend in the interbank market at
higher rate ρ than lending to the firms at lower corporate rate R. Similarly, the storage
return γ must be lower than the interbank lending rate ρ; otherwise all banks would find
it optimal to store and not participate in the interbank lending market. Banks p take the
interbank lending rate ρ and the corporate lending rate R as given and decides whether,
and how much to borrow or lend.
Let Φ be the borrowing per deposit by a borrowing bank p, where Φ ≥ 0 also denotes
the publicly observable and endogenous market funding ratio. If a bank p decides to
borrow Φ (per unit of deposit) from other banks at cost ρ then gets a gross unit return on
deposits equal to pR (1 + Φ) − ρΦ, and lends 1 + Φ (per unit of deposit) to the firm for
gross return pR. If a bank decides to lend to other banks, instead, then the gross return
on deposit is just ρ.
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Gross return on deposits for bank p is then
r(p) ≡ max {pR (1 + Φ)− ρΦ, ρ} (3.5)
Bank p chooses to be a borrower when
pR (1 + Φ)− ρΦ ≥ ρ⇔ p ≥ p̄ ≡ ρ
R
(3.6)
Inequality (3.6) imposes a participation constraint on bank p to be a borrower, not
a lender in the interbank market. Banks with p < p̄ are less efficient in intermediation
and hence lend to the more efficient banks p ≥ p̄, and the marginal bank p̄ is indifferent
between the two options. In a frictionless world, p̄ = 1 since all banks with p < 1 would
lend to the most efficient one with p = 1 in that case. The economies would have reached
the first-best allocations then. There are two frictions prevalent on the interbank market
which prevent the economies from reaching their first-best allocation: moral hazard and
asymmetric information.
Before explaining the details and solutions of the moral hazard problem and asym-
metric information in the interbank market we need to see the overall market flow in
figure 3.2. Households do not know the skill level of banks p, while this skill level is un-
known to other banks as well. Therefore asymmetric information rises. Banks with p ≥ p̄
borrows Φ per deposit from the interbank market, lends (1 + Φ) per deposit to the firms,
get (1+Φ)R from the firms in return, and finally returns ρΦ to the lender. However, banks
p < p̄may pretend to be high-skill bank and borrow from the interbank market and invest
in an alternative storage technology at a return γ. This gives rise to the moral hazard in
the interbank market.
3.5.3.2 Moral Hazard
We assume that the creditors cannot trace the proceeds of the storage technology and
therefore cannot seize those. As a consequence, borrowing banks may choose to renege
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Figure 3.2: Market Flows
on their interbank debt contracts and walk away from the lenders. So, interbank loan
contracts are not enforceable. A bank p that walks away with (1 + Φ)a and invests in
the storage technology, gets γ(1 + θΦ)a as payoff, where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the cost for walking
away from the interbank market after borrowing (the higher θ, the more this cost). Such
opportunistic behavior is referred as “diversion” (e.g., Hart, 1995; Burkart and Ellingsen,
2004).
Corporate finance literature (e.g., Tirole, 2006) refers the diversion as a standard moral
hazard problem: (i) the higher Φ also increases the gain from diversion, and the diversion
opportunity cost increases with (ii) bank efficiency p and (iii) the spread between the
corporate lending rate R and the return on the storage technology γ. The last feature,
which implies that as the corporate lending rate goes down, banks have an incentive
to walk away from the interbank market, is consistent with recent empirical evidence of
taking high risks by the banks during low interest rates. (see, e.g., Maddaloni and Peydró,
2011; Jiménez et al., 2014).
3.5.3.3 Asymmetric Information
The intermediation skill of the banks are private information; ex ante lenders cannot
observe them and also cannot verify them ex post. Therefore, lenders ignore any private
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incentives of the borrowers to divert funds. This makes the interbank loan contracts the
same for all banks, i.e., none of the market funding ratio (Φ), and the interbank lending
rate (ρ) depends on p. However, the lenders want to deter the borrowers from diverting.
This is done by limiting the quantity of funds to the borrowers so that the least efficient
banks with p < p̄ have no incentive to pretend as high efficiency bank and divert:
γ(1 + θΦ) ≤ ρ (3.7)
This is the incentive compatibility constraint which, eventually, sets a limit for Φ, i.e.,
the market funding ratio above which no bank would like to lend. Hence, it can also be
regarded as the lenders’ funding tolerance. At the optimum, this incentive compatibility
constraint binds and the borrowing banks utilize the full borrowing capacity:
Φ ≡ ρ− γ
γθ
The borrowing capacity (Φ) increases with the interbank lending rate (ρ). With a
higher ρ, banks lend more, and only more efficient (high p) banks keep demanding a
loan. Lenders have an incentive to tolerate a higher market funding ratio Φ since more
efficient banks have lower incentive to divert. Therefore, there is a positive selection effect
on the borrowers caused by an increase in the interbank rate. Symmetrically, there is a
detrimental effect on incentives caused by a decrease in the interbank rate. In limit, when
the interbank rate is equal to the return on storage (ρ = γ), the demand is null (Φ = 0)
since no borrowers can commit herself to repay.
3.6 Equilibrium Analyses
The interbank market equilibrium largely depends on whether the country is a closed
economy or integrated with other countries. We will first characterize the equilibrium of
the banking sector in one country without any integration (see Boissay et al., 2016 for full
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explanations). Then, we will introduce different dimensions of integration between two
countries and characterize the corresponding interbank market equilibrium.
3.6.1 Markets Without Integration
A. Interbank Market Clearing
In interbank markets equilibria of two countries without any integration, the inter-
bank rate ρ clears the markets. We seek for an equilibrium where the return on storage
is lower than the interbank rate (γ < ρ) so that the trade takes place (Φ > 0). In a world
of two countries without any integration, a mass µ(p̄) of banks lend and the complement
mass 1− µ(p̄) of banks borrow Φ per unit of deposit. The market clearing condition thus
becomes
Aµ
( ρ
R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply
= A
Extensive Margin︷ ︸︸ ︷[
1− µ
( ρ
R
)] Intensive Margin︷ ︸︸ ︷ρ− γ
θγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demand
(3.8)
⇔ R = Ψ(ρ) ≡ ρ
µ−1
(
ρ−γ
ρ−γ(1−θ)
)
The interbank market clearing condition shows that as the interbank rate, ρ increases
so does the aggregate supply, while there are two opposite forces in the aggregate de-
mand. On the one hand, an increase in the interbank rate causes lower aggregate demand
because fewer borrowers demand funds at higher rate; this is an extensive margin effect.
On the other hand, a higher interbank rate increases the borrowing capacity and thus
aggregate demand of funds; this is the intensive margin effect. At the aggregate level,
when there are more borrowers, i.e., when ρ is small enough the later effect more than
offsets the earlier effect. It follows that when the interbank rate ρ is small, the aggregate
demand curve bends backward and increases with ρ. The function Ψ(ρ) is strictly convex
and there exists a threshold R̄ ≡ Ψ(ρ̄) for the corporate loan rate R above which there are
two equilibria with trade and below which there is no equilibrium with trade. In the later
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Figure 3.3: Interbank Market Clearing
case, there exists a cutoff p̄ = γ/R such that banks with p < p̄ store, banks with p > p̄
lend to the firm, and bank p̄ is indifferent. We will refer to such no-trade equilibrium as
a banking crisis. However, such equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the trade equilib-
rium and therefore we rule out this equilibrium assuming that banks always coordinate
in trade equilibrium. Figure 3.3 shows the overall situation.
B. Aggregate Corporate Loan Market Clearing
The aggregate supply of corporate loans depends on the existence of the interbank
market operations. On the one hand, when interbank trades take place, the supply of
corporate loans is A, i.e., all bank assets are channeled to the firms. On the other hand,
when the interbank market is frozen, banks with p < γ/R use the storage technology and
the aggregate supply of corporate loans is [1 − µ(γ/R)]A. The demand of aggregate cor-
porate loan is determined through solving for capital, k from firm’s profit maximization
problem. Thus, the aggregate corporate loan clearing condition is
f−1k
(
R + δ − 1
z
)
=
 A for equilibrium with tradeA [1− µ ( γ
R
)]
otherwise
(3.9)
where fk(k) ≡ ∂F (k, 1)/∂k.
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Figure 3.4: Banking Crises Zone
C. Interbank Loan Market Freeze
The interbank loan market freezes if and only if
A > A ≡ f−1k ((R + δ − 1)/z)⇔ z < z ≡ (R + δ − 1)/fk(A);
otherwise, the interbank loan market operates. A is the “absorption capacity” of the
banks. This is the maximum quantity of assets that the banks can allocate efficiently.
Above this threshold there is no trade in the interbank market because of the counterparty
fears. This is equivalent to the TFP threshold z, below which the interbank market freezes.
Market freezes thus result either from the overaccumulation of assets by the household
or from an adverse productivity shock that reduces banks’ absorption capacity, or from a
combination of both endogenous and exogenous factors. Figure 3.4 exhibits this situation.
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3.6.2 Two firms Closed Economy Model
Let us continue to think in terms of a closed economy. There are two firms i = 1, 2 with
identical technology and equal mass (0.5 each). Their productivity follows the same AR(1)
process, but the shocks to productivity are independent draws. As far as the banking
sector’s deposit, loan, and interbank rates are concerned, they will continue to follow
the relationships derived in previous sections. The wages, i.e., Marginal Productivity of
Labor (MPL) across the two firms must be identical. The labor market equilibrium (with
household supplying labor inelastically at 1) is as follows:
z1fh (k1, h1) = z2fh (k2, h2)
0.5 (h1 + h2) = 1
For Cobb-Douglas technology with α as the capital share, capital/labor ratio across
the two firms will follow
k1
h1
=
(
z2
z1
) 1
α k2
h2
(3.10)
Since both types rent capital at the same market rate, their Marginal Productivity of Cap-
itals must be equal.
k1
h1
=
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α k2
h2
(3.11)
However, (3.10) and (3.11) can not hold simultaneously. Thus only the high produc-
tivity firm will produce. It will rent all the capital and hire all the labor available in the
economy. The equilibrium is trivially the same as in Boissay et al. (2016), except that
max {z1, z2}will be the economy’s productivity.
3.6.3 A Two-country World with Perfect Integration
In a closed economy model the monitoring costs (1− p)R are rebated back to the
households to abstract from wealth effects of monitoring costs. In a two-country world,
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where a country’s savings may end up for deposit and loans in another country, we will
assume that these transfers go to the source of the savings. Suppose all capital markets
and labor markets are integrated in a symmetric two-country world. The environment is
then equivalent to a closed economy with two firms. Only one country will produce by
renting the entire world’s capital and hiring the total labor supply of the two countries.
This case is obviously not interesting.
3.6.4 A Two-country World without Labor Mobility
In this section, we assume that households can work only at the domestic firm. Un-
der this restriction, firms in both countries will operate and produce. Under integration,
deposits made by household, deposits taken by banks, and loans made by banks may
differ. Let Aj continue to be the aggregate deposits made by households of country j, let
Dj denote the deposits taken by a (ex-ante identical) bank of country j, and kj denote the
loan (that equals the capital stock) taken by the representative firm in country j.
We will alternatively consider environments in which cross-border deposits are (1)
permitted or (2) prohibited. In each of these, we will in turn consider cases in which (i)
cross-border interbank as well as corporate loans are permitted, (ii) only corporate loans
are permitted and (iii) only interbank lending is permitted.
3.6.4.1 With Cross-border Deposit Mobility
In this subsection, we assume that the depositors and the banks in either country are
free to make and take cross-border deposits.
a (i): With Open Interbank and Corporate Loan Markets
In this case, banks can lend to both banks and corporates of either country. From the
perspective of depositors, all banks are then multinational and ex-ante identical. The total
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deposits of the two countries A1 +A2 will be equally deposited at all the banks, now with
a mass of 2. Therefore the deposits taken by each bank will be
Dj = D =
A1 + A2
2
(3.12)
Under interbank trade the interest rate ρ will be common across the two countries.
Furthermore, the firms’ borrowing rate R will also be common. Then, with inelastic labor
supply fixed at unity, the two countries’ capital ratios will follow from (3.11) as
k1 =
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α
k2 (3.13)
The market clearing condition for the corporate loan market can be expressed as
∑
j
kj =
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
=

∑
j Aj for trade equilibrium[
1− µ
(
γ
R
)]∑
j Aj otherwise
(3.14)
where the first case holds if and only if R > R > Ψ (ρ̄).
When interbank trade exists, the total supply of interbank loans will equal the total
demand:
2Dµ
( ρ
R
)
= 2D
[
1− µ
( ρ
R
)] ρ− γ
θγ
(3.15)
a (ii): With Open Corporate Loan Market Only
Let us continue to assume that household can deposit in either country’s banks. While
banks cannot make cross-border interbank loans, the firms can still borrow from banks
across the border. Banks can still lend to other domestic banks and therefore the interbank
loan market equilbrium must satisfy
Dµ
(ρj
R
)
= D
[
1− µ
(ρj
R
)] ρj − γ
θγ
.
where we have incorporated the fact that with open corporate loan market, R is common
across the two countries. The above in turn implies that ρwill also be common and so will
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be the per unit deposit rate. Once again, from the perspective of the depositors, banks in
the two countries are fullly multinational. As in the previous case with complete banking
sector integration, the deposits are
Dj = D =
A1 + A2
2
The two countries’ capital ratios will follow from (3.11) as
k1 =
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α
k2
The market clearing condition for the corporate loan market can be expressed as
∑
j
kj =
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
=

∑
j Aj for trade equilibrium[
1− µ
(
γ
R
)]∑
j Aj otherwise
where the first case holds if and only if R > R > Ψ (ρ̄).
a (iii): With Open Interbank Market Only
Let us continue to assume that household can deposit in either country’s banks. While
banks can make interbank loans internationally, the firms can only borrow from their own
country’s banks. The banks are no-longer multinationals – their opportunity sets now
diverge. Hence, the deposits they attract are no-longer going to be identical. They will be
determined by the equilibrium as described below.
First note that two arbitrage conditions must hold. First, deposit rates offered by banks
must be equal across the two countries. Second, under interbank trade, no storage will
occur in either country.
Lemma 1 In an interbank trade equilibrium the corporate loan rates in both countries are equal-
ized.
Proof. Let Φj ≥ 0 be the publicly known interbank borrowing (per unit of deposit) in
country j. Irrespective of Φj , the cutoff rule for the marginal lender/borrower bank is:
p̄j =
ρ
Rj
.
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Since household can deposit in either country, all banks (in both countries) must offer the
same deposit rate:
r = Rj
∫
ρ
Rj
p
dµ (p)
1− µ (p)
Hence, Rj = R for both country j. This in turn requires that
k1 =
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α
k2
Since no storage occurs under interbank trade
k1 + k2 = A1 + A2
Finally, since the incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality, i.e., γ (1 + θΦ) =
ρ, in both countries the borrowing capacity, Φ = ρ−γ
γθ
must be the same. Within each
country the mass of banks lending in the interbank market, µ( ρ
R
), is the same. Also the
borrowing per unit of deposits for the banks making corporate loans Φ is the same. This
implies that
kj = Dj
Banks in each country attract an amount of deposit that clears the domestic interbank
lending as well as corporate loans. Hence, once the deposits are made, there is no need
for cross-border interbank or corporate loans.
The banking sector equilibrium within each country follows the closed economy, which
leads to the following proposition
Proposition 1 Interbank trade exists in both countries if and only if
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
≥
∑
j=1,2
Aj
The converse of this result is that a banking sector freeze must occur simultaneously
across the two countries. However, the deposit rates will still be the same across the two
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countries. This is only possible if
r = Rj
 γ
Rj
µ
(
γ
Rj
)
+
∫
γ
Rj
p
dµ (p)
1− µ (p)
 for both country j.
Once againRj = R for j = 1, 2 must hold and the capital used by firms must follow (3.13).
Corollary 1 Under a banking sector freeze, the equilibrium capital allocations and corporate loan
rate {k1, k2, R} are given by∑
j
kj =
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
=
[
1− µ
( γ
R
)]∑
j
Aj;
k1 =
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α
k2.
Finally, in an interbank trade equilibrium, the equilibrium rate ρ (R) continues to be
determined by (3.15) with 2D on its both sides now trivially replaced by
∑
Dj :(∑
j=1,2
Dj
)
µ
( ρ
R
)
=
(∑
j=1,2
Dj
)[
1− µ
( ρ
R
)] ρ− γ
θγ
(3.16)
3.6.4.2 Without Cross-border Deposit Mobility
Banks in each country now take only domestic deposits:
Dj = Aj. (3.17)
However, their asset side has no cross-border restrictions. We now sequentially consider
the three alternatives.
b (i): With Open Interbank and Corporate Loan Markets
The banking sector equilibrium in this case is fairly similar to that under case a(i) ex-
cept for the size of the banks’ balance sheets. Banks now have access to only domestic
pool of deposits. The amount of loans therefore have to balance accordingly. With com-
mon corporate loan rates in the two countries:
k1 =
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α
k2
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must hold. However, unlike in case a(i) kj 6= Dj = Aj now. That is, firms in country j
may be borrowing from the other country and vice versa. When interbank trade exists, a
common ρ = Ψ−1(R) emerges from (3.16)(∑
j=1,2
Aj
)
µ
( ρ
R
)
=
(∑
j=1,2
Aj
)[
1− µ
( ρ
R
)] ρ− γ
θγ
Finally, the world-economy will jointly experience a credit crunch iff
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
<
∑
j
Aj,
where R = Ψ (ρ̄). The corporate loan market clearing can be expressed as
∑
j
kj =
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
=

∑
j Aj for trade equilibrium[
1− µ
(
γ
R
)]∑
j Aj otherwise
where the first case holds if R > Ψ (ρ̄).
b (ii): With Open Corporate Loan Market Only
Here, banks can make cross-border loans to firms and therefore R must be equal in
the two countries. Banks can make within country interbank loans. Let ρj denote within
country interbank rates. The interbank loan market equilibrium can now be expressed as
Ajµ
(ρj
R
)
= Aj
[
1− µ
(ρj
R
)] ρj − γ
θγ
.
Obviously, Ψ : ρ→ R is common for both countries.
Proposition 2 With open corporate loan markets, within country interbank lending rates are
equal.
With common corporate loan rates in the two countries:
k1 =
(
z1
z2
) 1
1−α
k2
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must hold. However, as in b(i) kj 6= Aj . As in b(i), the world-economy will jointly experi-
ence a credit crunch iff ∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
<
∑
j
Aj,
where R = Ψ (ρ̄). The corporate loan market clearing can be expressed as
∑
j
kj =
∑
j=1,2
f−1kj
(
R + δ − 1
zj
)
=

∑
j Aj for trade equilibrium[
1− µ
(
γ
R
)]∑
j Aj otherwise
where the first case holds if R > Ψ (ρ̄). In the second case, the amount stored in each
country equals µ
(
γ
R
)
Aj .
b (iii): With Open Interbank Market Only
Under interbank trade, once again, ρ will be common in both countries. However,
corporate loan rates may no longer be equal. The interbank loan market equilibrium can
now be expressed as
A1µ(p̄1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Supply
+ A2µ(p̄2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign Supply
= A1[1− µ(p̄1)]Φ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Demand
+A2[1− µ(p̄2)]Φ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign Demand
Using Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ = ρ−γγθ , and p̄j =
ρ
Rj
, the market clearing condition becomes,
A1µ
(
ρ
R1
)
+ A2µ
(
ρ
R2
)
=
[
A1
(
1− µ
(
ρ
R1
))
+ A2
(
1− µ
(
ρ
R2
))]
ρ− γ
θγ
(3.18)
⇔ A1
A2
= −µ2(1 + Φ)− Φ
µ1(1 + Φ)− Φ
where, µj = µ
(
ρ
Rj
)
for j ∈ {1, 2}.
It is not possible to characterize the properties ofR1 andR2 as a function of ρ. We need
to characterize ρ as a function of R1 and R2. It further complicates the multiplicity prob-
lem by perhaps increasing its dimensionality. One may have to address this numerically.
Suppose a solution exists such that R1, R2 > ρ > γ. In equilibrium
kj = f
−1
kj
(
Rj + δ − 1
zj
)
, for j = 1, 2, (3.19)
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and the market clearing for corporate loans requires supply of corporate loans, lj be
lj = Aj
[
1− µ
(
ρ
Rj
)](
1 +
ρ− γ
θγ
)
, for j = 1, 2. (3.20)
Under a closed economy the aggregate supply of corporate loans in normal times
would be the total deposit collected by the banks. However, equation (3.20) is a novel
finding of the model where the aggregate corporate lending does not only depend on the
savings of the households, i.e., A but on other factors- such as- corporate lending rate-R,
interbank lending rate- ρ, and storage components- γ and θ as well.
There are now five unknowns in the model: {R1, R2, k1, k2, ρ}. If an equilibrium exists,
they should sensibly solve the five equations: (3.18), (3.19), and (3.20).
If there is no solution to the above problem, then we are back in the crisis world. Both
countries will be in autarky with their capital employment and the loan rates given by
the two equations:
lj =
[
1− µ
(
γ
Rj
)]
Aj = f
−1
kj
(
Rj + δ − 1
zj
)
, for j = 1, 2
while the amount stored in each country equals µ
(
γ
Rj
)
Aj .
Banking sector’s return on deposit: The return on deposits depends on three factors:
corporate loan revenue, interbank lending revenue, and the borrowing cost. These factors
are as follows for country j = 1, 2:
Corporate loan revenue:
∫ 1
p̄j
p [Rj (1 + Φ)] dµ(p)
Interbank loan revenue:
∫ p̄j
0
pρdµ(p)
Interbank borrowing cost:
∫ 1
p̄j
pρΦdµ(p)
The banking sector’s return on deposit would be:
rj ≡
∫ 1
0
rj(p)dµ(p)
=
 Rj
[∫ 1
p̄j
p(1 + Φ)dµ(p)
]
+
∫ p̄j
0
pρdµ(p)−
∫ 1
p̄j
pρΦdµ(p) for equilibrium with trade
Rj
[∫ 1
γ/Rj
pdµ(p)
]
+ γµ
(
γ
Rj
)
otherwise
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Rearranging this, we have
rj =

∫ p̄j
0
pρdµ(p) +
∫ 1
p̄j
p [Rj + Φ(Rj − ρ)] dµ(p) for equilibrium with trade
Rj
[∫ 1
γ/Rj
pdµ(p)
]
+ γµ
(
γ
Rj
)
otherwise
(3.21)
where under the equilibrium trade, the first term represents the interbank lending rev-
enue of a µ(p̄j) mass of banks those are lenders and the second term denotes the corporate
loan revenue plus profit from market funded capital for a 1 − µ(p̄j) mass of banks those
are borrowers. In contrast, when there is no equilibrium exists with trade, there is no
banking intermediation, and a mass µ(γ/Rj) of banks find it optimal to use the storage
technology.
3.6.5 General Equilibrium
Before we proceed to the quantitative analysis, a general equilibrium of the world
economy in which two countries connected only with open interbank market is defined
as follows. The state variables for a particular individual’s optimization problem in coun-
try j are (i) the individual asset holdings aj , (ii) the aggregate asset holdings {A1, A2},
and (iii) the realization of the technology shocks {z1, z2}. Let s = {A1, A2, z1, z2}. In the
sequel, we denote by Γj(s) the perceived law of motion of aggregate assets in the coun-
try j and by Rj(s), rj(s), and ρ(s) and wj(s) the pricing functions for corporate loans,
deposits, interbank loans and labor, respectively; we also denote by πj(s) and χj(s) the
profit and rebate functions. All these functions are function of aggregate assets {A1, A2}
and productivity {z1, z2}, which are both taken as given by the household and capture the
presence of externalities. The household j′s recursive optimization problem written as
V (a, s) = max
a′,c,n
u(c− ν(n)) + βEtV (a′, s′) (3.22)
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subject to
a′ + c = r(s)a+ w(s)n+ π(s) + χ(s)
A′ = Γ(s)
where, in the calibrated version of the model, u(x) = x1−σ/(1−σ) and ν(n) = n1+ν/(1+
ν). The solution to this problem is a set of decision rules a(aj, s), n(aj, s), and c(aj, s).
The firm’s problem in country j is simply given by
max
k,h
zF (k, h) + (1− δ)k − w(s)h−R(s)k,
which leads to the decision rules k(s) and h(s). Finally, the solution of banks’ problem in
country j leads to the aggregate loans l(s) and φ(s) = (ρ(s)−γ)/γθ, where only aggregate
assets enter the solution due to the linearity of the problem. In the recursive rational
expectation equilibrium, actual and perceived law of motions coincide in each country j,
respectively.
3.6.5.1 Definition (Recursive competitive general equilibrium)
A recursive competitive equilibrium of the world economy, given the aggregate state s =
{A1, A2, z1, z2}, is a sequence of prices defined by the pricing functions R(s), r(s), ρ(s), and w(s),
two perceived law of motions for aggregate assets Γ1(s) and Γ2(s), and a set of decision rules
for each country j = 1, 2 of {c(aj, s), a′(aj, s), k(aj, s), h(aj, s), φ(aj, s), l(aj, s)} with the value
function V (aj, s) such that,
1. {c(aj, s), a′(aj, s), n(aj, s)} and V (aj, s) solve the household j’s recursive optimization prob-
lem taking Rj(s), rj(s), wj(s), πj(s), χj(s) and Γj(s) as given.
2. kj(s) and hj(s) solve the firm j’s optimization problem taking Rj(s), wj(s) as given.
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3. φj(s) solves the banks’ optimization problem taking Rj(s), rj(s), and ρ(s) as given. Aggre-
gate loans in each country j are, respectively
lj(s) =
 Aj
[
1− µ
(
ρ
Rj(s)
)](
1 + ρ−γ
θγ
)
, if A ≤ Ā(z1, z2)[
1− µ
(
γ
Rj(s)
)]
Aj, otherwise
4. The perceived law of motion for aggregate assets is consistent with the actual law of motions:
a′j(a, s) = Γj(s).
5. Wages satisfywj(s) = zjFh(kj(s), hj(s)), and the corporate loan rate satisfiesRj = zjFk(kj(s),
hj(s)) + 1− δ, the deposit rate satisfies
rj(s) =

∫ p̄j(s)
0
pρdµ(p) +
∫ 1
p̄j(s)
p [Rj(s) + Φ(Rj(s)− ρ)] dµ(p) if A ≤ Ā(z1, z2)
Rj(s)
[∫ 1
γ/Rj(s)
pdµ(p)
]
+ γµ
(
γ
Rj(s)
)
otherwise
where p̄j(s) = ρ(s)/Rj(s)
6. The aggregate intermediation cost rebated to the household is given by χj(s) = (Rj(s) −
rj(s))Aj − (Rj(s)− γ)(Aj − kj(s)), and the firm j’s profits are equal to zero, πj(s) = 0.
7. Goods, labor, capital, and interbank market clear:
cj(Aj, s) + a
′
j(Aj, s) = zjF (kj(s), hj(s)) + (γ + δ − 1)(Aj − kj(s)) + (1− δ)Aj
hj(s) = nj(Aj, s)
kj(s) = lj(s)∑
j=1,2
Ajµ
(
ρ(s)
Rj(s)
)
=
∑
j=1,2
Aj
[
1− µ
(
ρ(s)
Rj(s)
)]
ρ(s)− γ
θγ
8. The banking sector’s absorption capacity is given by
Ā(z1, z2) =
(
1− α
ϑ
) 1
ν
(
α
R̄ + δ − 1
) ν+α
ν(1−α) ∑
j=1,2
z
1+ν
ν(1−α)
j
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3.7 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we investigate the quantitative properties of the interbank market equi-
librium of the model in two parts. First, we set the functional forms and the parameters
to calibrate the interbank market equilibrium. Second, we investigate the results on the
equilibrium for different possible states. Following Boissay et al. (2016), we investigate
the quantitative properties of the general equilibrium model using the calibrated values
of the parameters from Table 1.
3.7.1 Calibration
The technology of the representative firm production is represented by a constant re-
turns to scale production function of the form zjF (kj, hj) ≡ zjkαj h1−αj with α ∈ (0, 1) for
j = 1, 2. The capital elasticity α is set to 0.3 in the production function, and we assume that
the capital depreciation rate is 10 percent per annum (δ = 0.1). We also assume the per-
sistence of the productivity shock ρz = 0.89 and standard deviation of productivity shock
σz = 0.013 or 1.3 percent following Boissay et al. (2016). For the Foreign country, we use
the AR(1) estimates that are consistent with those of the peripheral European countries
so that σzf = 3 percent. We solve the model numerically using the collocation method,
with decision rules iterations as in Boissay et al. (2016), allowing for discontinuities in the
asset accumulation at the points at which the economy switches regime.
The banking sector parameters include the distribution of banks µ(·), the diversion
technology parameter, θ, and the return on storage γ. We assume that µ(p) = pλ with
λ ∈ R+. The other banking parameters are calibrated jointly so that a financial recession
occurs rarely (on average every 42 years as in fact 1) and satisfying other targets as in
Boissay et al. (2016). Table 1 has the calibration parameters for the interbank market
equilibrium.
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Table 3.1: Calibration Parameters
Parameters Variable Value
Discount factor (Deflated for growth) β 0.971
Inverse of Frisch elasticity ν 0.500
Labor disutility ϑ 0.945
Risk aversion σ 2.000
Capital elasticity α 0.300
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.100
Std. of productivity shock in Home Country σzh 0.013
Std. of productivity shock in Foreign Country σzf 0.030
Persistence of productivity shock ρz 0.890
Bank distribution; µ(p) = pλ λ 26.00
Diversion cost θ 0.085
Storage technology γ 0.952
3.7.2 Results
To solve for the five unknowns (R1, R2, k1, k2, ρ), we need to work with five equations:
(3.18), (3.19), and (3.20). The first equation is interbank equilibrium:
A1µ
(
ρ
R1
)
+ A2µ
(
ρ
R2
)
=
[
A1
(
1− µ
(
ρ
R1
))
+ A2
(
1− µ
(
ρ
R2
))]
ρ− γ
θγ
Replacing µ(p) = pλ, we get
A1
(
ρ
R1
)λ
+ A2
(
ρ
R2
)λ
=
[
A1
(
1−
(
ρ
R1
)λ)
+ A2
(
1−
(
ρ
R2
)λ)]
ρ− γ
θγ
(3.23)
The second and third equations are capital allocations:
kj = f
−1
kj
(
Rj + δ − 1
zj
)
, for j = 1, 2
Replacing the production function F (k, 1) = kα we get
kj =
(
Rj + δ − 1
αzj
)1/(α−1)
, for j = 1, 2 (3.24)
The fourth and fifth equations are supply of corporate loans:
kj = Aj
[
1− µ
(
ρ
Rj
)](
1 +
ρ− γ
θγ
)
, for j = 1, 2
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Replacing values of kj from (3.24) and µ(p) = (p)λ we get(
Rj + δ − 1
αzj
)1/(α−1)
= Aj
[
1−
(
ρ
Rj
)λ](
1 +
ρ− γ
θγ
)
, for j = 1, 2. (3.25)
Now, we have three unknowns: R1, R2, and ρ, in three nonlinear equations (3.23) and
(3.25).
In case of interbank market freeze, interbank rate ρ is equal to the storage return γ and
the corporate loan rates Rj comes from[
Rj + δ − 1
αzj
]1/(α−1)
=
[
1−
(
γ
Rj
)λ]
Aj, for j = 1, 2 (3.26)
Since under financial integration (open interbank only with no deposit mobility) the
state space includes A1, A2, z1, and z2, we can fix asset holdings and productivity of coun-
try 1 to see what happens to the solution at one point at a time. By fixing these at an av-
erage value we get similar results like Boissay et al. (2016), i.e., given asset accumulation
A, if the productivity z goes down below a threshold then the country gets into banking
crisis. The country also gets into crisis if for a given productivity level z, a country saves
beyond a threshold level. These results are visible from figure 3.5.
In figure 3.5, the red crosses are the crisis zones, i.e., either productivity is very low
given the asset level or/and asset accumulation is very high given a below average pro-
ductivity level. Here, we assume that the asset level and productivity level of country 1
are at an average level.
Figure 3.6 exhibits the interbank market equilibrium given fixed asset holding and
productivity for country 1, and fixed asset holding but varying productivity level of coun-
try 2. We have fixed the asset holding of both countries at an average level but varied the
productivity level to identify in which cases we have an interbank market operation and
in which cases there are market freezes. The dotted line is for low productivity in both
countries where we observe no interbank market operation. This result is intuitive be-
cause low productivity in both countries implies low requirement of capital while saving
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Figure 3.5: Crisis and No Crisis Zone
Figure 3.6: Interbank Market Equilibrium with varying productivity
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Figure 3.7: Interbank Market Equilibrium with varying saving
is relatively high. A higher supply with lower demand for corporate loans causes a reduc-
tion in the corporate loan rate such that no interbank lending occurs. The solid line is for
high productivity in both countries where there is interbank market operation. However,
we have multiple equilibria for such high productivity in both countries. The dashed line
is for low productivity in country 1 but high in country 2 and we observe market freeze
in this case. This is the most interesting and a key finding of this chapter . With sustain-
able saving and high productivity, country 2 could have an interbank trade equilibrium
without any integration with country 1. However, since it has decided to “sail together”,
now it must also “sink together” under no interbank trade equilibrium in the integrated
world.
Figure 3.7 shows the interbank market equilibrium with fixed average productivity
for both countries but varying saving level. The solid line is for average saving level of
both countries where there is multiple equilibria with interbank trade. The dashed line
has high saving for country 1 but low saving for country 2. We have multiple trade equi-
libria in this case as well. However, the difference is in this time country 1 can survive
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even with high level of saving because it decided to “sail together” with country 2 and
their extreme end saving levels average outed. This is the positive outcome of integra-
tion which was the motive for integration. However, in the dotted line country 1 has
an average asset holding while country 2 has high level of saving and there is no trade
equilibrium. Country 1 could have an interbank trade equilibrium without any integra-
tion with country 2 but because they integrated they have to experience a “sink together”
situation and an interbank market freeze. This is the negative outcome of the integration.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the corporate lending rates in the home country (R1) and the
foreign country (R2), respectively, with respect to different levels of asset accumulation
(A2) and productivity (z2) in foreign country but same average levels in the home coun-
try. With low level of asset accumulation and increasing productivity level in the foreign
country, the relative demand for capital rises by the firms in the foreign country. This re-
quires an interbank funds flow from the home country to the foreign country. Therefore,
the corporate lending rate goes down in the home country and goes up in the foreign
country. This is also true for medium level of asset accumulation in the foreign country.
Table 3.2: R1 (in net percentage rate) with varying A2 and z2
z2
Low Medium High
Low 1.64 1.60 1.58
A2 Medium 2.09 1.95 1.83
High 3.00 3.00 2.33
Table 3.4 shows that the interbank lending rate (ρ) also goes up for increasing produc-
tivity in the foreign country (z2), given low or medium level asset accumulation in the
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foreign country and average level of asset accumulation (A1) and productivity (z1) in the
home country due to increased overall productivity and capital demand. However, when
foreign country accumulates high level of asset, the interbank market only works when
the foreign country also has high level of productivity.
Table 3.3: R2 (in net percentage rate) with varying A2 and z2
z2
Low Medium High
Low 2.73 3.79 4.87
A2 Medium 0.62 1.26 1.93
High 3.00 3.00 0.70
Table 3.4: ρ (in gross rate) with varying A2 and z2
z2
Low Medium High
Low 0.971 0.974 0.976
A2 Medium 0.965 0.967 0.970
High 0.950 0.950 0.965
It is also evident from the tables 3.2 and 3.3 that for given productivity in the foreign
country (z2) and asset accumulation and productivity in the home country (A1, z1), if as-
set accumulation by the foreign country goes up from low to medium then, the corporate
lending rate in the foreign country (R2) goes down for overall increase in the supply of
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Figure 3.8: Impulse response to a one standard deviation technology shock
capital. Table 3.4 shows that this also reduces the interbank lending rate (ρ). Due to the
equilibrium effect, the corporate lending rate in the home country (R1) goes up. How-
ever, with high level of asset accumulation in the foreign country the intrebank lending
market goes into a freeze since the total accumulation of two countries surpasses the total
absorption capacity.
We assume the economy is at the steady state with the long-run average of z to analyze
the home country response. Figure 3.8 compares the dynamics in the model (thick plain
line) with those in a frictionless model (round markers). It is evident from the figure
that output, consumption, investment, and hours worked are comparatively larger than
those in Boissay et al. (2016). Therefore, a two-country model responds more than the
closed-economy model or the frictionless RBC model due to a larger interbank market
integrating banking sectors of two countries together.
Figure 3.9 and 3.10 shows the typical path to financial recessions of the Home country
and Foreign country, respectively. These are depicted from the simulation of the model
over 50,000 periods with the years of recessions and crises identified. By convention,
period 0 corresponds to the period when the financial recession (or the crises) bursts.
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Figure 3.9: Typical path to financial recessions in the Home country
Figure 3.10: Typical path to financial recessions in the Foreign country
Note that in the simulation, only the Foreign country is hit by the shock so that its banks’
absorption capacity (thick plain line) as well as the endogenous dynamics of banks’ assets
(thin plain line) cross out with each other around the crises, while those in Home country
are relatively stable.
Since two countries share the interbank market, the home country experiences finan-
cial recessions due to the contagion effect. Figure 3.11 shows the dynamics of the output
and credit gaps around recessions in the home country. Compared to that in the closed
economy, we see that the relative size and duration of financial recessions from simula-
tions both increase in the world economy. Thus, they confirm that the model generates
deeper and longer financial recessions than other recessions, which are associated with a
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Figure 3.11: Dynamics of output and credit gaps around recessions in Home country
boom-bust cycle in the credit. However, our two-country model generates financial re-
cessions with a frequency of 1.29 percent, nearly 50 percent lower than that in a closed
economy as in Boissay et al. (2016). In other words, the very nature of a shared interbank
market makes the economy less susceptible to negative productivity shocks, but the re-
sulted crisis are more pronounced if they occur. The intuition is that, an internationally
integrated interbank market endowed with a relatively larger ”absorbing capacity” acts
as a shield against negative shocks and fluctuations, which makes crisis less frequent. Ra-
tionally anticipating this, borrowers have more incentive to leverage and the gain from
diversion increases as well. The interbank moral hazard issue potentially becomes more
severe and implies larger macroeconomic contractions once induced by a crisis.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter , we offered a two-country model where the countries are symmetric.
Banks become heterogeneous by their private intermediation efficiency. This heterogene-
ity gives rise to an interbank market. However, due to the moral hazard problem along
with private intermediation skills, less efficient banks may have an incentive to borrow
in the interbank market and divert funds at a lower return asset. A borrowing capacity
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constraint restricts these less efficient banks from diverting the funds. However, a lower
corporate lending rate and interbank rate increases the incentive of these banks to divert
funds and the interbank market responds by lowering the borrowing capacity. At some
point, the interbank market goes to a freeze if the rates of return are sufficiently low.
A sequence of favorable productivity shocks lead to an expansion of credit. However,
when the productivity growth goes down from an increasing trend, corporate lending
rate goes down along with the demand. Counterparty risk goes up and the market stops
lending to each other. When two countries are integrated through interbank lending, a
market freeze in one country leads to a freeze in another country as well. Either two
countries have an operating interbank market or both goes into a freeze. Excessive credit
creation by one country triggers a two-country wide credit freeze. The countries may also
go into a freeze from very low productivity in either of the countries.
In this chapter , we made some strong assumptions for tractability reason and pre-
sented a stylized model. Indeed, we left out some features of the banking sector that
would deserve attention for future extensions. For example, we assume that households
cannot lend the firms directly and firms cannot issue any equity or debt securities. More-
over, we assume that firms do not default on loans. Another possibility would be time
or/and country varying return on storage technology. All these extensions are left for
future research.
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CHAPTER 4. FUTURE WORK SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The study in chapter 2 can be extended in terms of the settlement after default. I
assumed that the sovereign starts a new period with all previous debt forgiven by the
lenders after a stochastic period of exclusion from the international credit market follow-
ing a default. However, the sovereign is usually given extended period of repayment or
granted debt cut during a settlement after default. It would be interesting to observe the
default probabilities and bond prices after such inclusion of settlements as in Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2015). A more challenging work would be endogenizing the maturity
structure of bonds where the sovereign not only chooses the level of short- and long-
term bonds but also chooses the maturity of long-term bonds as an endogenous outcome.
Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) and Hatchondo et al. (2016) study the multiple ma-
turity structure but the sovereign does not choose the maturity structure endogenously.
Therefore, this will be an interesting addition to the literature as well.
The study of chapter 3 can be extended in terms of the cost of diverting funds to the al-
ternative storage technology by the low-skill banks. We assumed this storage technology
is the same in both countries. It would be interesting to observe the interbank equilibrium
with varying storage technology cost. Moreover, the return from the storage technology
is also assumed the same in both countries. It would also be interesting to observe the in-
terbak equilibrium with varying return from the storage technology. Boissay et al. (2016)
has a closed economy model. We extended in various dimensions while keeping the pa-
rameters same in both countries.
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